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I. INTRODUCTION
The proposed final judgment between the United States Department
of Justice ("DOJ") and Microsoft Corp. ("Microsoft") has been
intensely debated. Thousands of public comments I have been made,
and numerous books and law review articles2 have been written, on the
subject. Much of the debate has focused on whether the proposed final
* Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law, University of Utah. LL.B., Georgetown University
(1961); B.S. cum laude, Boston College (1963); S.J.D. University of Michigan (1967). Professor
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** Visiting professor of law, University of Utah. J.D., 1998, Ph.D. (Economics), 1995,
University of Utah. Professor Bush is also a former Attorney General Honors Program Attorney
at the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice. The authors would like to
thank Joe Brodley, Bob Lande, Peter Carstensen, and Salvatore Massa for their comments. The
authors would also like to thank Brendan Sullivan, Kenneth Starr, Eugene Crew, and Nancy
Tompkins for their comments on the memo that would eventually become this Article. None of
the above is responsible for the analysis or content of this Article.
1. The DOJ reports that 33,867 comments were filed with them as of March 14, 2003. See
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Highlights, U.S. v. Microsoft Case Filings, Public
Comments (Tunney Act), Master Index of Comments on the United States v. Microsoft
Settlement, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-master.htm (last visited May 8, 2003). The
master list of public comment filings is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-
master.htm (last visited May 8, 2003).
2. See, e.g., KEN AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFT AND ITS ENEMIES (2001); JOHN
HEILEMANN, PRIDE BEFORE THE FALL: THE TRIALS OF BILL GATES AND THE END OF THE
MICROSOFT ERA (2001); Donald J. Boudreaux & Burton W. Folsom, Microsoft and Standard
Oil: Radical Lessons for Antitrust Reform, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 555 (1999); Kenneth G. Elzinga
et al., United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady?, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 633 (2001); John
J. Flynn, Standard Oil and Microsoft-Intriguing Parallels or Limping Analogies?, 46
ANTITRUST BULL. 645 (2001); Charles M. Gastle & Susan Boughs, Microsoft III and the Metes
and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2001);
Robert A. Levy, Microsoft and the Browser Wars, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1321 (1999); Howard A.
Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(2001); J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2001); David S. Stone, Who Really Won The Microsoft Appeal?, 18 COMPUTER & INTERNET L.
20 (Oct. 2001).
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judgment was "in the public interest," under the Antitrust Penalties and
Procedures Act ("Tunney Act"). 3 The Tunney Act requires the DOJ to
propose a final judgment in cases settled by a "consent decree," 4 accept
comments from the public, 5 publish the comments, and submit a written
summary of the comments to the adjudicating court.6 A judge then
determines, pursuant to the Tunney Act, whether the remedy being
proposed is "in the public interest." 7
There have been two Microsoft cases leading to final judgments. 8
Throughout the Tunney Act processes in both cases, however, there was
little discussion regarding the standards of judicial review that should
apply in a Tunney Act consent decree proceeding where no litigation
has taken place. There was also little examination of whether the
Tunney Act is the appropriate tool for a case in which there has been
litigation, findings of fact 9 or conclusions of law, 10 and more than one
appeal. 11  Regarding the government's first case against Microsoft
("Microsoft /,,),12 this Article will argue that the court used an
inappropriate standard of judicial review for proceedings under the
3. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (2000) and scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4. The Microsoft-proposed final judgment and competitive impact statements are available at
United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,452-01 (Dep't Justice Nov. 28, 2001).
5. See http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/ms-major.htm (last modified Feb. 15, 2002) for the
"major' public comments in the Microsoft case.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d).
7. Id. § 16(e)-(f). Subsection (e) of the Tunney Act states that "[b]efore entering any consent
judgment proposed by the United States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry
of such judgment is in the public interest." Id. § 16(e); see also infra note 65 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(e)).
8. The first Microsoft case resulting in a final judgment under the Tunney Act, United States
v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.94-1564, 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995), followed
reversal of the District Court's rejection of the proposed decree. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The second Microsoft case resulting in
a final judgment under the Tunney Act, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144,
150 (D.D.C. 2002) [hereinafter Microsoft If: Final Judgment], followed reversal of some of the
District Court's finding of violations of the Sherman Act and imposing a remedy of divestiture in
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001)
[hereinafter Microsoft II: Appeal].
9. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Microsoft
II: Findings of Fact].
10. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter
Microsoft H: Conclusions of Law].
11. See Microsoft II: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 46. The DOJ also had moved to have the Supreme
Court hear the appeal from the District Court under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (2000),
and was denied. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000).
12. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 321 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter
Microsoft I].
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Tunney Act. 13  Regarding the second case against Microsoft
("Microsoft If,),14 this Article will contend that the Tunney Act was
misused because, it was applied in circumstances where Congress did
not intend for it to be applied. 15
In Microsoft I, the court abused the Tunney Act by using it to justify
an inappropriate standard of judicial review for proceedings under the
Act. The degree of scrutiny that a district court should apply to a
consent decree under the Tunney Act was called into question. Despite
clear legislative history to the contrary,16 the court of appeals held that a
trial court must give deference to the DOJ and the DOJ's opinion that
the remedies provided in the consent decree are in the public interest.
17
This result may aptly be described as the first "Microsoft Fallacy": that
the Tunney Act was adopted to require a court to defer to the discretion
of the Department of Justice rather than to make its own independent
judgment about the propriety of the relief negotiated in its review of
antitrust consent decrees.18
In Microsoft II, following the trial, the DOJ misused the Tunney Act
by calling the judgment it proposed to remedy violations of the Sherman
Act a "consent decree." 19  An additional abuse occurred when the
district court ruled that the proposed settlement was a "consent decree"
within the meaning of the Tunney Act and applied the standards of the
first "Microsoft Fallacy" in its review of the proposed settlement. 20
13. See infra Part IV (discussing the standard of judicial review used in Microsoft I).
14. Microsoft II refers to the litigation initiated in 1998 against Microsoft that resulted in the
following decisions: Microsoft I: Findings of Fact, 65 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999); Microsoft II:
Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); an appeal, Microsoft 1I: Appeal, 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); the subsequent remand to Judge Kollar-Kotelly
and her final judgment in the case, Microsoft II: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C.
2002).
15. See infra Part VI (discussing the misuse of the Tunney Act).
16. See infra Part II (discussing the legislative history of the Tunney Act).
17. See infra Part IV (discussing the court's holding in Microsoft 1).
18. A fallacy is "[alny reasoning, exposition, argument, etc., contravening the cannons of
logic." FUNK & WAGNALL'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
456 (Comprehensive ed. 1995). The most frequently referenced fallacy in Antitrust is the
Cellophane fallacy (the false notion that the existence of substitutes means that no market power
exists). See Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281,
308-13 (1956) (pointing out, in a seminal piece, the existence of the Cellophane fallacy); see also
Gene C. Schaerr, Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's Guidelines for
Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670, 676-77 (1985) (comparing the Cellophane fallacy to the
DOJ's merger guidelines).
19. Microsoft II: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002); see also infra Part
VI (discussing the decision of the court of appeals in Microsoft /1).
20. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2002) (mem.) [hereinafter
Microsoft II: Memorandum Opinion].
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This result may be described aptly as the second "Microsoft Fallacy":
that Congress intended the Tunney Act to be applied to proposed
settlements arrived at after litigation of a government antitrust case.
This Article will show that the DOJ's proposed final judgment is not a
"consent decree" within the meaning of the Tunney Act but rather is
merely a proposed judgment subject to the broader equitable authority
of the court under § 4 of the Sherman Act.21
The position set forth in this Article is simple but has enormous
implications for future consent decree cases like Microsoft I. This
position, if espoused, could also mean reversal for the remedy phase of
Microsoft H on appeal. Both Microsoft cases are significant for future
government cases in which litigation has taken place and a settlement is
proposed by the parties to resolve the case. Extending deference to a
consent decree negotiated by the DOJ, like the one mandated in
Microsoft I, rather than making an independent determination of
whether the decree is in the "public interest," undermines the central
objective Congress sought to achieve by adopting the Tunney Act.
This Article also maintains that the Tunney Act does not apply to
cases "where testimony has been taken," 22 let alone cases litigated to a
final judgment finding a violation of the antitrust laws. The language of
the Tunney Act, as well as the legislative histories of the Tunney Act
and § 5(a) of the Clayton Act,23 make clear that the Tunney Act does
not apply to litigated cases and reserves the right to determine the
appropriate remedy under § 4 of the Sherman Act for the courts. 24
21. See infra Part VII (discussing proper application of the Tunney Act or § 4 of the Sherman
Act).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000).
23. Id.; see also infra Part II (discussing the legislative histories of the Tunney Act and the
§ 5(a) of the Clayton Act).
24. Section 4 of the Sherman Act provides that "[tihe several district courts of the United
States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violation of sections 1 to 7 of this
title." 15 U.S.C. § 4. The jurisdiction conferred is that of the courts, not some parties to the case
to negotiate a decree, and it is a jurisdiction that includes the prevention of future violations as
well as to "pry open to competition in a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal
restraints. If this decree accomplishes less than that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a
cause." Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947). As the Court noted in
International Salt Co. v. United States:
The District Court is not obliged to assume, contrary to common experience, that a
violator of the antitrust laws will relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely
than the court requires him to do. And advantages already in hand may be held by
methods more subtle and informed, and more difficult to prove, than those which, in
the first place, win a market. When the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear
violation of law, it is not necessary that all the untraveled roads to that end be left open
and that only the worn one be closed. The usual ways to the prohibited goal may be
[Vol. 34
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Moreover, prior decisions by the D.C. Circuit, with respect to Microsoft
H, indicate that the only appropriate course of action in the Microsoft H
litigation was to schedule a remedy trial under § 4 of the Sherman Act
upon remand.25 Instead, the government and Microsoft negotiated a
settlement, which they labeled a "consent decree." 26 The district court,
committing reversible error, held that the proposed settlement was a
"consent decree" within the meaning of the Tunney Act27  and
proceeded to review the merits of the proposed settlement under the
erroneous standards set forth in Microsoft I by giving deference to the
discretion of the Antitrust Division in arriving at what the court thought
was the appropriate remedy. 28
Making any portion of the remedy phase of litigated antitrust cases,
like Microsoft 11, a Tunney Act proceeding also raises serious
constitutional and procedural issues. First, it allows two of the parties
to co-opt the judicial function that Congress vested in the courts under
§ 4 of the Sherman Act29 and unconstitutionally transfers those powers
to the Executive Branch under the inappropriate standard of review
adopted in Microsoft I. Second, it deprives other parties to the lawsuit
of rights guaranteed them by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
blocked against the proven transgressor and the burden put upon him to bring any
proper claims for relief to the court's attention.
Id. at 400; see also United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (holding that courts have
a duty to order the most effective remedy possible); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,
323 U.S. 173 (1944) (holding that a district court has broad discretion to fashion a decree that will
be effective).
25. See Microsoft //: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 101. The Court "has recognized that a 'full
exploration of facts is usually necessary in order (for the District Court) properly to draw (an
antitrust) decree' so as 'to prevent future violations and eradicate existing evils."' United States
v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 22 (1945)), quoted in Microsoft 11: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 101.
26. Microsoft I1: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002); see also infra Part
VI (discussing the decision of the court of appeals in Microsoft II).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h).
28. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1232, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov.
12, 2002) [hereinafter Microsoft 11: Review of Proposed Final Judgment]. In the companion case
in which nine dissenting states tried separately the question of remedy, New York v. Microsoft
Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 184-85 (D.D.C. 2002), the district court rejected several claims for
additional remedies designed to close loopholes and strengthen the decree approved in the DOJ
case. It appears that the court gave deference to what it had already deferred to in approving the
proposed "consent decree" entered between the United States and Microsoft. Microsoft Corp.,
224 F. Supp. 2d at 184-85.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (making a final judgment or decree in "any civil or criminal" proceeding
brought on behalf of the United States to the effect that a defendant has violated the antitrust laws
of the United States "prima facie evidence against such defendant" with the proviso that "this
section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken").
2003]
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the mandate of the court of appeals. 30 Third, inappropriately applying
the Tunney Act diminishes the authority of the courts to determine an
appropriate remedy by reducing a court's role from active participant in
defining the remedy, to passive on-looker in deciding whether the
DOJ's judgment is in the public interest. On appeal, rather than
deferring to the findings of the trial court under the "clearly erroneous"
standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 1 a court
reviewing the trial court's remedy determination would apply the
standard of whether the district court has given due deference to the
DOJ's proposed judgment. Fourth, characterizing the proposed
settlement of a case after litigation has taken place as a Tunney Act
proceeding may deprive subsequent treble damage action plaintiffs of
the use of the "final judgment or decree" in subsequent litigation, in
violation of the express language of § 5(a) of the Clayton Act.32
For these reasons, it is disconcerting that the DOJ and the district
court in Microsoft H have chosen to invoke the Tunney Act for a
settlement initially proposed by only two of the parties where the
purported "consent decree" is submitted after a trial finding violations
of the Sherman Act on the merits. The DOJ's claim and the district
court's finding that the proposed decree in Microsoft H is a "consent
decree" within the meaning of the Tunney Act and § 5(a) of the Clayton
Act appear to be clearly unlawful on jurisdictional grounds, aside from
the questionable terms of the decree.
This Article first examines the legislative history of the Tunney Act
to determine the intent behind the Act's regulation of the consent decree
process. 33 Second, this Article, in order to determine whether light was
shed on the present issue, examines prior cases, in which it was unclear
whether the Tunney Act should be applied.34 To highlight the
consequences of the misapplication of the Tunney Act in the subsequent
Microsoft litigation, this Article also examines the misapplication of the
Tunney Act in the Microsoft I consent decree proceedings. 35  This
Article then examines the consequences of misapplying the Tunney Act
30. See infra Part VIE-F (including the right to participate in the court's determination of the
appropriate remedy and the right of treble damage action plaintiffs to use a final decree as prima
facie evidence of a violation).
31. FED. R. Civ. P.52.
32. Private parties are precluded from using Tunney Act proceedings as evidence in an action
under the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), (h).
33. See infra Part II (discussing legislative history of the Tunney Act).
34. See infra Part III (discussing judicial decisions addressing the issue of whether the Tunney
Act applies to consent decree proceedings).
35. See infra Part IV (discussing the misapplication of the scope of judicial review in
Microsoft I).
[Vol. 34
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to the Microsoft II settlement. 36  Finally, this Article provides a
framework for determining in which instances the Tunney Act is
applicable and those in which it is not.37 This Article concludes that the
Tunney Act applies to government settlements filed with the court
before trial commences, and that § 4 of the Sherman Act and the court's
equitable powers under that section apply to litigated cases thereafter. 38
Regardless whether the proceeding is a legitimate settlement by consent
decree or a proceeding after litigation has taken place, no deference is
due to the DOJ, whether the court applies the Tunney Act's "public
interest" standard or the Sherman Act's standard for equitable relief-
that the injunction "prevent and restrain" violations of the Act.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The genesis of the Tunney Act is derived from hearings on the
nomination of Richard Kleindienst to the position of United States
Attorney General. 39 These hearings quickly became known as the ITT
(International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.) hearings because the
major issue in Kleindienst's nomination became the settlement by
consent decree of the ITT/Hartford merger case, which occurred before
any litigation had taken place.40 The merger occurred after a
36. See infra Part V (discussing the consequences of the misapplication of the Tunney Act in
Microsoft 11). The authors first made these arguments in the context of a memo to Judge Kollar-
Kotelly. Because the Judge's clerk told the authors that the Judge did not wish to see any letters,
and because the Judge had denied any and all motions to intervene or file amicus curiae, the
authors submitted their memo to the DOJ to forward to Judge Kollar-Kotelly. The DOJ denied
the request, stating that it did "not believe such action would be appropriate." The authors then
submitted the memo, along with all correspondence from the DOJ, to plaintiffs in California
suing Microsoft under state antitrust laws. The California plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene as
a matter of right before Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who denied their motion. See Microsoft H:
Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002). The authors' submissions were solely
of their own volition and were not solicited, encouraged, supported, or paid for by any person,
corporation, think tank, or other entity with any relationship to any litigation, legislation,
ideology, or legal or economic issue of any kind related to this topic. All correspondence is on
file with the authors.
The press largely ignored the filing, in many instances incorporating it into discussions of the
Tunney Act proceeding. See, e.g., Jonathon Krim, Interested Parties Weigh in on Proposed
Microsoft Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at E4, available at 2002 WL 10944671.
37. See infra Part VI (discussing what truly constitutes a "consent decree" within the meaning
of the Tunney Act).
38. See infra Part VfI (suggesting what the proper application of the Tunney Act or § 4 of the
Sherman Act would entail).
39. Natalie L. Krodel, Comment, The Tunney Act: Judicial Discretion in United States v.
Microsoft Corporation, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1293, 1315 (1996).
40. United States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., No. CIV.A.13320, 1971 WL 549, at *1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 24, 1971).
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massive behind-closed-doors campaign [that] resulted in halting the
Justice Department's prosecution of the ITT case and its hasty
settlement favorable to the company. During these hearings, ...
[Senator Tunney] became concerned with the apparent weakness of
the consent decree process which could allow this kind of corporate
pressures to be exercised. 41
The basis of Senator Tunney's aggravation was the ITT antitrust suits
brought under § 7 of the Clayton Act42 by the DOJ in 1969 to prevent
ITW's43 acquisition of three companies. 44 The DOJ lost two of the three
suits. In 1971, the DOJ and ITT agreed to a settlement of the remaining
suit.45 ITT was allowed to retain Hartford Fire Insurance Co. but was
required to divest several Hartford subsidiaries. 46  The DOJ made no
public statement as to the underlying reasons for the settlement.
Instead, as was common practice at the time, the DOJ made public only
the proposed decree.47
The public perceived politics as the underlying motivation for
settlement after two significant events occurred. First, President Nixon
nominated Richard Kleindienst to be Attorney General of the United
States.48  Kleindienst had been involved in the ITT litigation in his
capacity as Deputy Attorney General and questions arose concerning his
participation in the settlement of the case.49 Second, ITT offered to
help finance the 1972 Republican National Convention. 50 Although no
quid pro quo was proven, the appearance of impropriety sparked
significant debate.
Moreover, Kleindienst's confirmation hearings revealed to the public
for the first time the underlying rationale for the DOJ settlement with
41. 120 CONG. REC. 38,585 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
42. Section 7 of the Clayton Act enables enforcement agencies to challenge stock or asset
acquisitions where the "effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
43. ITT was the nation's ninth largest company at the time of its attempted acquisitions.
Krodel, supra note 39, at 1314.
44. The companies were Grinnell Corp., Canteen Corp., and Hartford Fire Insurance Co.. The
DOJ lost at trial with respect to the Grinnell and Canteen acquisitions. See Note, The ITT
Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 595,
603 (1973).
45. Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need
for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7 (1996).
46. These subsidiaries, the government contended, were the "prime beneficiaries of the
alleged anticompetitive effects of the ITT/Hartford merger." See id.
47. See Note, supra note 44, at 604.
48. See Anderson, supra note 45, at 7.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Note, supra note 44, at 604.
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ITT.51 In the hearing, Kleindienst asserted that one reason for the
settlement was the DOJ's fear that divestiture would cause ITT's stock
price to fall, causing hardship to shareholders. 52 Another DOJ concern
apparently was that the plummeting stock price would ripple throughout
the economy of the United States.53
Ralph Nader moved to intervene to ask the court to set aside the
consent decree on the ground that it was obtained by "'fraud ....
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."' 54 The
district court denied Nader's motion, finding that hardship on
shareholders was a legitimate DOJ consideration in settling the case.55
As was true in the consent decree process prior to the enactment of the
Tunney Act, third parties could only participate via a motion to
intervene or by filing an amicus brief with the court. 56 Such a motion
was granted only if the substantial interests of the movant were "less
than adequately represented" by the DOJ.57 Typically, the motion
would not be granted. The secret negotiations of the DOJ in the ITT
case and the inability of third parties to intervene, when combined with
judicial "rubber-stamping" of consent decrees brought before the courts
by the DOJ, prompted legislation designed to cure these ills.
The Supreme Court endorsed the view that courts should give
deference to the DOJ in the imposition of consent decrees in Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States.58 The Sam Fox Publishing Co. case
confronted the Court with an appeal from an order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had denied
51. See generally Anderson, supra note 45, at 7.
52. Id.
53. See Note, supra note 44, at 604.
54. United States v. ITT, 349 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D. Conn. 1972) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(3)).
55. ld.at30-31.
56. Of course, amicus briefs are allowed at the pleasure of the court, while motions to
intervene as a matter of right are usually denied. See infra note 57 (discussing motions to
intervene in antitrust suits).
57. 17T, 349 F. Supp. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. CIBA
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court in United States v. CIBA Corp. explained:
It seems apparent from Cascade [Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.] and
other cases that the interest justifying intervention as of right in an antitrust suit
brought by the United States must be substantial, must lie at the center of the
controversy, and must be shown clearly ... to be less than 'adequately represented' by
the Department of Justice. This would appear to harmonize fairly the procedural aims
of the Rule and the perhaps more fundamental principles governing the role of the
Attorney General of the United States in representing the "public interest" in federal
antitrust proceedings.
CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. at 513.
58. Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961).
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the appellants' motions to intervene as a matter of right in a proceeding
to modify a consent decree previously entered in a government antitrust
suit. 59 The court upheld the denial of the motion and also added that a
court should not entangle itself in modifications of consent decrees,
stating that "sound policy would strongly lead... [the Court] to decline
appellants' invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government's
judgment in negotiating and accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least
in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of
the Government in so acting." 6
0
In the Tunney Act, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's notion
that courts must give deference to the DOJ when determining if a
consent decree is in the public interest. Instead, Congress wanted the
courts to make an independent, objective, and active determination
without deference to the DOJ. The legislative history is replete with
references to Congressional distaste for judicial rubber-stamping of
consent decrees. As Senator John Tunney stated:
The mandate [of the court to independently determine the public
interest] is a highly significant one because it states as a matter of law
that the role of the district court in a consent decree proceeding is an
independent one. The court is not to operate as a rubber stamp, placing
an imprimatur upon whatever is placed before it by the parties. Rather,
it has an independent duty to assure itself that entry of the decree will
serve the interests of the public generally.
Though this may seem a truism to some, too often in the past
district courts have viewed their rules [sic roles] as ministerial in
nature-leaving to the Justice Department the role of determining the
adequacy of the judgment from the public's view. Although in most
cases that judgment may be a reasonable one, there may well be
occasions when it is not. Furthermore, submission of the proposed
59. Id. at 684.
60. Id. Not surprisingly, the DOJ advocated a return to pre-Tunney rubber-stamping in
Microsoft 1:
Moreover, in making its determination, the Court properly accords significant weight
to the United States' predictive judgments as to the efficacy of remedial provisions.
Indeed, such deference is proper even outside the consent decree context. See Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972) ("'once the Government has
successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts
as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor"') (quoting United States v. E.L du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961)). Similarly, it is proper to defer to the
United States as representative of the public interest when the parties are requesting
entry of an agreed-upon judgment.
Mem. of the United States in Supp. of Entry of the Proposed Final J., Microsoft H: Review of
Proposed Final Judgment, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. CIV.A.98-1232),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/flO100/10143.htm#l (last visited May 8, 2003).
Note that both cases cited by the DOJ are pre-Tunney Act cases.
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decree to the court and its subsequent embodiment in a judgment lends
a permanence that endures long after the passing of a particular
administration of the Department.
For all these reasons, the mandate placed upon the court by this
section, even though a general one, carries with it a major
significance. 6
1
Congress inserted the Tunney Act into § 5 of the Clayton Act, as
§ 5(b)-(h). Prior to passage of the Tunney Act, the only reference to
consent decrees was found in what would be renumbered as § 5(a) of
the Clayton Act. That section expressly provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has
violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto: Provided, that this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken.6 2
61. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 452
(1973). Senator Tunney stated during hearings:
[T]he concept that the trial court judge ought to be independently involved in making
the determination that the proposed decree is in the public interest must be preserved.
The purpose of section 2(d) is to insure that the court shall exercise its independent
judgment in antitrust consent decrees-and not merely act as a rubberstamp upon out-
of-court settlements.
Id. at 3-4. Senator Ed Gurney argued:
The bill further requires that the court accept a proposed consent decree only after it
determines that to do so is in the public interest. This is a particularly important
provision, since after entry of a consent decree it is often difficult for private parties to
recover redress for antitrust injuries.... In some cases, the court may find that it is
more in the public interest, for this reason and others, that the case go to trial instead of
being settled by agreement.
Id. at 8. Senator Tunney, in response to a proposal by Professor Harvey Goldschmid that the
judicial review provision be excised, stated, "It is very important to me that the court not act as a
rubber stamp, that it make an independent evaluation, as it does in other kinds of cases." Id. at
24. He later added, "we certainly are intending to have the judges do more than they have
done ... because many judges just rubber-stamp the consent decree. That might be just fine for
the Antitrust Division, but I am not convinced that it is fine for the public interest." Id. at 196;
see John J. Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53
IOWA L. REV. 983 (1968) (cited in above hearing); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1463 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6538 ("One of the abuses sought to be remedied by the bill
has been called 'judicial rubber-stamping' by district courts of proposals submitted by the Justice
Department.").
62. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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The interrelation between § 5(a) of the Clayton Act and the newly
added provisions of the Tunney Act sheds light on what Congress
understood consent decrees to mean. The Tunney Act was added to § 5
of the Clayton Act in 1974 and was designed to deal with the settlement
of antitrust cases before any litigation had taken place. When the
Tunney Act was added, Congress understood § 5(a) to mean that
"consent decrees" were antitrust decrees entered prior to litigation of a
case and there was no intent to change that meaning by adding the
Tunney Act amendments to § 5 of the Clayton Act. 63 This fact is clear
from the language of § 5(e)(2) of the Tunney Act amendment to § 5 of
the Clayton Act,64 where a court, as part of its public interest
determination of whether to approve a "consent judgment proposed by
the United States under this section" is instructed to consider "the
impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the
complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be
derived from a determination of the issues at trial.-65  Settlements
crafted after litigation had taken place, or cases litigated to final
determinations of fact and law, as in Microsoft II, were not considered
"consent judgments" by Congress within the meaning of the Tunney
Act.66 Congress considered only those cases settled prior to litigation,
63. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining the historical understanding of
consent decrees).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2000).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this
section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public
interest. For the purpose of such determination, the court may consider:
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other
considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination
of the issues at trial.
Id. § 16(e) (emphasis added). As further evidence of congressional intent to have the court make
an independent evaluation of a proposed consent decree, § 5(f) provides that the court may take
the testimony of public officials or expert witnesses, appoint a special master, authorize full or
limited participation in the proceedings by interested persons, review any comments filed by the
public, or "take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem appropriate." Id. §
16(0.
66. Those cases where the government chooses to dismiss the case after litigation has taken
place and before judgment has been entered obviously would not be subject to the Tunney Act
because dismissal of the action would not constitute a "consent decree" within the meaning of the
Act.
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such as Microsoft I, to be "consent decrees" subject to the requirements
of the Tunney Act.
67
In Microsoft H, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ignored the language of
§ 5(e)(2) of the Tunney Act, which showed that Congress understood
the term "consent decrees" to apply only to proposed settlements
entered before any litigation of "the violations alleged in the complaint"
had taken place.68 Similarly, Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not examine the
extensive legislative history indicating that those proposing and voting
for the legislation also understood the concept to be limited to proposed
decrees negotiated by the DOJ and an antitrust defendant prior to any
litigation taking place.69  Instead, the court appeared to assume that a
proposed decree entered into at any time in the litigation process was a
"consent decree" for purposes of the Act. The court did so by
67. Congress consistently has sought to preserve the right of private litigants to benefit from
public antitrust enforcement and maintain the incentive of the threat of treble damage actions to
invoke consent decrees and nolo contendere pleas. The 1959 Antitrust Subcommittee Report
emphasizes the importance of the prima facie effect and its relationship to consent decrees:
Because of the protracted nature of antitrust litigation, with the expense and
complexity of proof of the legal and economic issues involved, it is difficult at best for
a private citizen to prosecute to conclusion an action under the antitrust laws. When
the private litigant is deprived of the use of the Government's decree as prima facie
evidence, moreover, a private action becomes virtually impossible to maintain.
ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON THE CONSENT
DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 24 (Comm. Print 1959). The Antitrust
Subcommittee Report credits the effect of § 5(a) (at the time it was numbered § 5) as the reason
why consent decrees were entered into so often. Id. at ix; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Breaking
Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L.
REV. 17, 18 n.8 (1983) ("In 1914, § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), was passed
providing that plaintiffs in private antitrust suits may use nonconsent 'final judgments' obtained
by the United States in civil or criminal antitrust suits as 'prima facie evidence.' The purpose of
§ 5(a) was clearly to facilitate private actions." (citing 51 CONG. REC. 1962, 1964 (Jan. 20, 1914)
(President Wilson's Special Message to Congress))).
68. The Court stated: "Nothing in the language of this subsection [referring to § 5(b)],
expressly or impliedly, indicates that the Act's provisions are inapplicable to consent decrees
proposed after commencement of trial but in advance of a final judgment." Microsoft II:
Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2002). Although that may be true of § 5(b),
it is not true of the remaining sections of the Tunney Act. Section 5(e)(2) provides that before
entering "any consent judgment... under this section," the court may consider "the impact of
entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be
derived from a determination of the issues at trial." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (emphasis added).
This language, expressly and impliedly, clearly indicates that Congress understood the meaning
of "consent decrees" subject to § 5(b) to be limited to settlement proposals arrived at before trial.
69. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing a history of the Tunney Act Senate
debates). Senator Tunney, when introducing the bill that later became the Tunney Act, defined
"consent decrees" as "voluntary settlements negotiated between defendants and the Government
and adopted by the court prior to trial." The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings
on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 450 (1973) (emphasis added).
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emphasizing the word "any" in § 5(b) ("any proposal for a consent
judgment") without exploring the meaning Congress intended for the
words "consent judgment. '70 In what can only be described as a form
of circular reasoning, the court ignored the express language of
§ 5(e)(2), 71 other express language in the Act suggesting a distinction
between consent decrees and other judgments and decrees, 72 the views
of those proposing and voting for the Act, and the long-standing
understanding that consent decrees were settlements proposed prior to
any litigation taking place.73 Even though all consent judgments may
be the product of proposed settlements, it is clear that Congress did not
understand that all proposed settlements were "consent decrees" for
purposes of the Tunney Act.74
The court sought to buttress its analysis by arguing that the language
of § 5(a), creating the prima facie effect of a final judgment or decree
"shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any
testimony has been taken," would be "surplusage" if the "taking of
testimony in th[e] case renders it too late for introduction of a proposed
'consent judgment."' 75 This analysis is curious because the proviso was
inserted to distinguish consent judgments entered before testimony has
been taken from other forms of "final judgment or decree" 76 -a
distinction that, on its face, indicates an intent to distinguish between
70. Microsoft H: Memorandum Opinion. 215 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2).
72. Section 5(d) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(d), requiring
the Attorney General to consider comments by the public, refers to comments on a "proposal for
the consent judgment submitted under subsection (b) of this section" (15 U.S.C. § 16(b)), not
judgments or decrees filed under this "section." One possible inference from the face of the
statutory language is that Congress was distinguishing the type of consent decree filed under
§ 5(b) from the "final judgments or decrees," whether settlements or litigated decrees, referred to
in § 5(a) of the Tunney Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
73. See, e.g., infra notes 81, 86-87, 89, and 93 (discussing the long-standing understanding
that consent decrees were considered settlements).
74. To hold otherwise would undermine the long-standing policy of Congress to encourage
the settlement of government antitrust cases without a trial because of the threat of treble damage
litigants having the benefit of the prima facie effect of § 5(a). By holding that a settlement after
full litigation of a government antitrust case is a "consent decree," the threat of § 5(a) is
undermined and antitrust defendants can take their chances by fully litigating government cases,
settling if they lose, and claiming that the settlement is a "consent decree" in subsequent treble
damage litigation. Part VIII of the Final Judgment, in New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp.
2d 76, 277 (D.D.C. 2002), expressly asserts that position: "Nothing in this Final Judgment is
intended to confer upon any other persons any ights or remedies of any nature whatsoever
hereunder or by reason of this Final Judgment."
75. Microsoft 11: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7.
76. Senator Ed Gurney, a co-sponsor of the bill, expressly stated: "By declining to give it
prima facie effect as a matter of law, the attractiveness of consent decrees is thereby preserved."
119 CONG. REC. 24,601 (1973).
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proposed settlements before any litigation has taken place and litigated
judgments and decrees entered pursuant to negotiated settlements after
litigation has taken place. Rather than being "surplusage," the language
of the proviso is integral to the distinction between the kind of "consent
decrees" Congress intended to be subject to a Tunney Act process and
those settlements and litigated decrees entered after trial had begun,
which Congress did not intend to be covered by the Tunney Act.
77
The court also sought to support its circular analysis, and avoid
defining the term "consent judgment," by referring to testimony on the
Tunney Act by opponents-but not proponents-of the Act.78 Resort to
testimony by those opposed to the Act, rather than those who supported
and drafted the Act, is not a persuasive ground upon which to establish
the meaning of key concepts used in the statute. The well-established
meaning of "consent decree" at the time of the adoption of the Tunney
Act was limited to "voluntary settlements negotiated between
defendants and the Government and adopted by the Court prior to
trial."' 79  Any other interpretation is inconsistent with the express
language of § 5(a) and § 5(e)(2) of the Clayton Act, the express
intention of the proponents of the Act, and the well-understood meaning
of "consent decree" at the time the Act was adopted.
Congress recognized the consent decree process of settling antitrust
cases without litigation as creating "an orbit in the twilight zone
between established rules of administrative law and judicial
procedures"; the purpose of the Tunney Act was "to substitute
'sunlight' for 'twilight."' 80  The Tunney Act would accomplish this
purpose by regulating and making uniform judicial and public
procedures exposing the Justice Department's decision to enter into a
77. The court appeared to attach some significance to the proximity of the sections in
which the terminology "'consent decree" was used, principally § 5(a) and § 5(b). Microsoft ll:
Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 7. If proximity were relevant, then that factor would
also support an interpretation that the concept "consent decree" means that form of judgment or
decree entered into before "any testimony has been taken" and would not include proposed
settlements negotiated after testimony has been taken. 15 U.S.C. § 5(a).
78. Microsoft 11: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 7-8. Not surprisingly, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly cited to the opponents of the Tunney Act, given that they are cited in the DOJ
brief. See Mem. of Pl. United States in Resp. to the Cal. Pl.'s Mot. for Intervention, or in the
Alternative, for Leave to File a Br. Amicus Curiae in the Tunney Act Settlement Proceedings
Currently Pending in this Ct. at 14-15, Microsoft I: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2002) (No. CIV.A.98-1232 (CKK)) [hereinafter DOJ Reply Mem.].
79. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 450
(1973) (emphasis added).
80. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, H.R. REP. No. 93-1463 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6537 (citation omitted).
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proposal for a consent decree before any litigation had taken place.81
Similar to fully litigated cases, settlements created after litigation had
taken place were understood to be subject to judicial review under the
standards of § 4 of the Sherman Act, by which a court has the discretion
to investigate the merits of the proposed settlement and independently
determine the remedy. 82
There is no indication that Congress intended to eclipse the sunlight
of traditional judicial procedures for dealing with settlements after
litigation has begun or in fully litigated cases where the determination
of remedies belongs to the trial court under § 4 of the Sherman Act with
the open and full participation of all the parties to the case. Nor does it
appear that Congress sought to remove the significant incentive
provided by § 5(a) of the Clayton Act to induce antitrust defendants to
enter into settlements "before any testimony is taken." 83  The 1974
House Report on the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act specifically
limits the purpose of the Tunney Act to consent decree procedures in
cases where no testimony has been taken:
Given the high rate of settlement in public antitrust cases, it is
imperative that the integrity of and public confidence in procedures
relating to settlements via consent decree procedures be assured. The
bill seeks precisely to accomplish this objective and focuses on the
various stages of consent decree procedures, including that process by
which proposed settlements are entered as a court decree by judicial
action.
Ordinarily, defendants do not admit to having violated the antitrust
or other laws alleged as violated in complaints that are settled. The
antitrust laws express fundamental legal, economic and social policy.
Present law.., encourages settlement by consent decrees as part of
the national legal policies expressed in the antitrust laws. Consent
decrees, unlike decrees entered as a result of litigation, are not
available as prima facie evidence against defendants in subsequent
private antitrust cases. The bill preserves these legal and enforcement
policies, and, moreover, expressly makes judicial proceedings brought
under the bill as well as the impact statement required to be filed prior
81. The Antitrust Division's Manual for Attorneys describes consent decrees as a means to
obtain relief without litigation: "It is often possible to obtain effective relief without taking the
case to trial. This Section describes the procedures used by the Antitrust Division in negotiating
and entering civil consent judgments under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974,
15 U.S.C. § 16 .. " U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, ch. IV-E (2d ed.
1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch4.htm (last visited May 8,
2003).
82. See supra note 24 (discussing § 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4). There is a parallel
provision for claimed violations of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 25.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
[Vol. 34
The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act
thereto inadmissible against defendants of the public antitrust action in
subsequent antitrust actions, if any. Various abuses in consent decree
procedures by the Antitrust Division and by district courts are,
however, sought to be remedied as a matter of priority since as the
Senate Report on the bill, Senate Report No. 93-298, aptly observed,
"by definition, antitrust violations wield great influence and economic
power." (p. 5).84
If the proposed settlement were a "consent decree" within the Tunney
Act, then § 5(h) of the Clayton Act 85 would bar use of the decree and
other remedy phase evidence in subsequent treble damage actions.
Such a result would violate the express language of § 5(a) and the clear
legislative history concerning "decrees entered as a result of
litigation." 86  The obvious consequences of treating a settlement
negotiated by the government and an antitrust defendant after litigation
of a case as a "consent decree" is to remove the incentive Congress
thought important to settle a case without litigation and minimize or
eliminate the threat of subsequent treble damage plaintiffs' ability to
rely upon the prima facie effect of a judgment or decree entered in favor
of the government.
Senator Tunney indicated that the procedures set forth applied to
consent decrees and not to settlements after litigation took place or
judgments were litigated fully. 87 The amendment to § 5 of the Clayton
Act left the original § 5 intact, except that the section was renumbered
§ 5(a), and subsections (b) through (h) were added.88 There is no
evidence of intent to change the meaning of the concept "consent
decree" 89 from its original connotation, which refers to settlements prior
84. H.R. REP. No. 93-1463, pt. 1 (1971), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6536-37
(emphasis added).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 16(h).
86. H.R. REP. No. 93-1463, pt. I.
87. When asked what would happen if a court refused to enter a consent decree, Senator
Tunney replied that the parties "could try to work out a new agreement which would meet with
the judge's approval or proceed with the litigation." See Consent Decree Bills: Hearings on H.R.
9203, H.R. 9947 and S. 782 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 43 (1973); see also id. at 176 (George D. Reycraft states:
"The only way I know of to get rid of [antitrust cases] is that you try them, settle them by consent
decree, or you dismiss them.").
88. That part of § 5 dealing with suspension of the statute of limitations during the pendency
of a government civil or criminal action was separated from § 5(a) and renumbered § 5(i). 15
U.S.C. § 16(i).
89. The Tunney Act understanding of the meaning of the concept "consent decree" is
consistent with the historical understanding that a "consent decree" is a decree entered to settle a
pending government antitrust case before any testimony is taken in the case and not settlements
or decrees entered after testimony is taken. In 1959, the House Committee on the Judiciary
defined a "consent decree" as "[a]n order of the Court agreed upon by the representatives of the
20031
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to any litigation taking place. Similarly, there is no suggestion that
Congress intended to disturb the application of what is now § 5(a) of the
Act or the prima facie effect of a final judgment once testimony has
been taken. 90 The Senate Report on the bill specifically indicates that
the bill was aimed at
80 percent of all complaints filed by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice [that] are settled prior to trial by the entry of a
consent decree. The entry of a consent decree is a judicial act which
requires the approval of a United States district court. Once entered,
the consent decree represents a contract between the government and
the respondent upon which the parties agree to terminate the litigation.
Pursuant to the terms of the decree, the defendant agrees to abide by
certain conditions in the future. However, the defendant does not
admit to having violated the law as alleged in the complaint.91
Attorney General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct challenged by the Attorney
General in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act or related statutes."
Consent Decree Program of the Department: Hearing Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., at ix (Comm. Print 1959); see also Dep't of Justice,
Consent Decrees & Procedures, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 8811, at 13,062 ("A consent decree is
a final judgment entered in a government antitrust action for injunctive relief before any
testimony has been taken.").
90. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act originally read:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prinia facie evidence against such
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such
defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree
would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall
not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to impose any limitation on
the application of collateral estoppel, except that, in any action or proceeding brought
under the antitrust laws, collateral estoppel effect shall not be given to any finding
made by the Federal Trade Commission under the antitrust laws or under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 45] which could give rise to a claim
for relief under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 16 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000)). This is the original language
of § 5 of the Clayton Act prior to passage of the Tunney Act. The legislative history clearly
indicates a desire to preserve this prima facie effect in litigated cases. See supra note 84 and
accompanying text (quoting the 1974 House Report on the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act).
91. S. REP. No. 93-298, at 5 (1973) (emphasis added). The legislative history also makes
clear that Congress intended to preserve the incentive of the threat that litigating a government
antitrust case would provide treble damage claimants with a prima facie case of violation should
the government win. By doing so, scarce enforcement resources could be maximized. Permitting
an antitrust defendant to litigate an antitrust case and then settle it by a claimed "consent decree,"
purporting to defeat the prima facie effect of the judgment, would obviously circumvent this clear
policy of Congress to limit consent decrees to those judgments entered before any litigation has
taken place. Section 5(h) of the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(h), was included in the statute
to insure that the competitive impact statement and proceedings under § 5(e) and § 5(f)
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The legislative history of the Tunney Act 92 demonstrates that it was
designed to provide a procedure for bringing light to the process of
judicial adoption of a consent decree entered into in pending civil
antitrust cases "before any testimony is taken"93 by the government and
a defendant. It was not intended as a substitute for the normal
procedures followed in a fully litigated case resulting in a finding that
accompanying a consent decree, entered without any evidence having been taken, could not be
used as prima facie evidence in subsequent treble damage actions. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f) (2000).
The Congressional purpose was "to retain the consent judgment as a substantial antitrust
enforcement tool." S. REP. No. 93-298, at 7. Section 5(a) of the Act was left unchanged.
meaning that in those cases settled or carried to judgment after "testimony has been taken" the
prima facie effect of § 5(a) still applied.
92. When the California plaintiffs filed their motion to intervene as a matter of right, the DOJ
replied that the legislative history undermined their position that a consent decree could only be
entered into before testimony has been taken:
The legislative history of the Tunney Act itself also undermines Movants' "historical
understanding." Although it contains numerous indications that Congress had focused
its attention primarily on consent decrees entered before trial, as most are, that history
also includes references to settlements reached later in the judicial process, and there is
no indication that Congress intended to exclude such settlements from Tunney Act
coverage. For example, Representative [Edward] Hutchinson, then the ranking
minority member of the House Judiciary Committee and of its Monopolies and
Commercial Law subcommittee, inserted into a hearing record an argument against
encouraging federal judges to review Department of Justice decisions accepting less
than full relief for alleged violations. In the course of that argument, he plainly
recognized the possibility that circumstances arising during prosecution of a case might
make settlement seem appropriate. And Thomas E. Kauper, then Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, specifically noted in his testimony before the Senate
subcommittee considering the legislation that "a consent decree ... may come after
trial, even." Thus, contrary to Movants' contention, the historical record confirms that
the unambiguous language of the Tunney Act means what it says: "[any proposal for a
consent judgment submitted by the United States for entry in any civil proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust law," 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)
(emphasis added), is within the scope of that Act.
DOJ Reply Mem., supra note 78, at 14-15. However, the citations the DOJ used to support its
position are dubious. The two individuals they cite, Representative Edward Hutchinson and
Assistant Attorney General Thomas Kauper, opposed the bill. It seems inappropriate to use a
bill's detractors to interpret what the bill means and claim their opposition is legitimate
"legislative history." Moreover, on the pyramid of legislative history reconstruct-on, the opinion
of a non-legislator is somewhere on the periphery. That is, typically the plain language of the bill
is examined, followed by Conference Reports, then House and Senate Reports, etc. Usually the
words of those subject to the bill are less than authoritative.
93. The earliest consent decrees make clear that they were consent decrees because testimony
had not been taken. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp.. 28 F. Supp. 168 (D.
Del. 1939) (noting that the decree was entered into without the taking of testimony): United
States v. Sugar Inst., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (reaching final judgment without
hearing testimony); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 3 F. Supp. 23 (D. Del. 1933) ("And it
appearing that by reason of the consents of the defendants to this decree and the acceptance of the
same by the petitioner it is unnecessary to proceed with the trial of the cause or to take testimony
therein or that any adjudication be made by the Court of the issues presented by the pleadings
herein .. ") (emphasis added).
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an antitrust defendant has violated the antitrust laws. To hold otherwise
would raise serious constitutional issues of the Executive Branch
invading powers expressly conferred on the judiciary by § 4 of the
Sherman Act.94 Consequently, the jurisdiction of the Microsoft II court
to consider the appropriate remedies to be entered in the case should not
have been premised upon a Tunney Act proceeding but, rather, should
have been predicated on § 4 of the Sherman Act and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Several courts have been confronted with the issue of whether the
Tunney Act applies to "consent decree" proceedings. Although the
answers have been divergent, no court has said that the Tunney Act
applies where testimony has been taken.
95
94. In a dissent from the appeal of Judge Greene's modification of the proposed "consent
decree" in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff d sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter AT&T], a consent decree entered into after
considerable litigation of the issues in the case and before the trial court ruled on the merits of the
case, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Tunney Act standard for reviewing the proposed
decree was both broad and vague. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent went on to observe: "It is not clear to me that this
standard, or any other standard the District Court could have devised, admits of resolution by a
court exercising the judicial power established by Art. Ili of the Constitution." Id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
The problem of judicial review of true consent decrees under the Tunney Act standards existing
in the "twilight" between the administrative and judicial process still persists in important cases
like Microsoft I because the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for a hearing and a
record of the negotiations of the specific terms of the decree do not apply, and the negotiation
process can still be carried out in secret, as they were in Microsoft I and H. The court ends up
with a proposed remedy and any subsequent hearings focus on the "is" of the proposed decree
and not the "ought" of what the court should implement as the appropriate remedy. In cases
where no litigation on the merits, much less a final decision, has occurred, a court appropriately
might give some deference to the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch to settle the
proposed litigation under the "public interest" standard of § 5(e) of the Tunney Act. The court
could also seek additional assistance in evaluating the merits of the proposed decree as provided
by § 5(f) of the Tunney Act. Because Microsoft H was not a case where a Tunney Act "consent
decree" could be entertained, and the court had a litigated record, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law from which to fashion a remedy, it was inappropriate for the court to defer to
the negotiating skills and stamina of the DOJ and the defendant. Deference to prosecutorial
discretion, once the case is litigated, improperly invades the discretion committed to the courts by
Congress under § 4 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05
(1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); see also infra Part VI.B (discussing
the application of consent decrees under separation of powers principles).
95. The American Antitrust Institute asked Senator Tunney to file comments in the Microsoft
proceeding. His comments note that Microsoft failed to comply with the reporting provisions of
the Tunney Act. See Aff. of John V. Tunney, available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/
mstuncom/major/mtc-00032065.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002). He, however, was not asked
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A. Pre-Tunney Act Use of the Term "Consent Decree"
Numerous pre-Tunney Act decisions addressed the meaning of the
term "consent decree." Typically, the issue would arise under § 5 (now
§ 5(a))96 of the Clayton Act. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act recognizes
the distinction between litigated judgments and consent decrees entered
before testimony is taken by making the former prima facie evidence of
a violation for subsequent treble damage actions. In contrast, consent
decrees entered before testimony has been taken are not made prima
facie evidence in subsequent treble damage actions. Decrees entered on
a stipulation of facts, for example, have been held to be settlements and
not "consent decrees" entitled to exemption from § 5(a) of the Clayton
Act. 97 Guilty pleas have also been given prima facie effect.98 Prior to
the adoption of the Tunney Act, courts treated consent decrees as
something less than a litigated judgment.99
Inconsistent usage of the term, however, has raised questions as to
whether consent decrees could occur after litigation has begun and
before a final judgment has been rendered. For example, the DOJ has
argued that the phrase "before any testimony has been taken," would be
surplusage if Congress had adopted the view that consent decrees could
only be proposed prior to litigation but not after litigation begins and
prior to final judgment.l°° The DOJ also argued:
whether the Act was applicable to the Microsoft case given that findings of fact and conclusions
of law had already been entered.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
97. Gurwitz v. Singer, 218 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D. Cal. 1963) ("Inasmuch as there is a clear
distinction between consent decrees and decrees rendered upon findings and conclusions based
upon stipulated facts, it must be assumed that Congress deliberately eliminated from items to be
excluded judgments or decrees rendered pursuant to findings of fact and conclusions of law based
on stipulated facts.").
98. See Panache Broad. of Pa., Inc. v. Richardson Elecs., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13069, at
*61 (N.D. I11. 1992).
99. See, e.g., United States v. ITr Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975)
("Consent decrees and orders have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees or...
administrative orders. Although they are arrived at by negotiation between the parties and often
admit no violation of law, they are motivated by threatened or pending litigation and must be
approved by the court or administrative agency."); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,
681 (1971) ("Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has
produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues
involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense and inevitable risk of
litigation.").
100. See DOJ Reply Mem., supra note 78, at 12. This was one of the arguments adopted by
Judge Kollar-Kotelly when holding that the proposed settlement in Microsoft II was a "consent
decree" within the meaning of the Tunney Act. Microsoft II: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2002).
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[Clourts prior to enactment of the Tunney Act routinely used the term
"consent decree" to refer to negotiated judgments entered after the
taking of testimony-and even after affirmed liability findings. For
example, in the well-known antitrust case United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and a decree, after trial. The Supreme Court affirmed as to certain
liability findings, reversed as to others, and remanded for further
proceedings. Then, "[u]pon remand, certain of the defendants entered
into consent decrees with the government; as to the others, lengthy
hearings and deliberations [were] had." The Supreme Court itself, in
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., referred to a
decree it had rejected (for failure to comply with its mandate) as a
"consent decree" even though it had been agreed to following a trial
on the merits and a Supreme Court determination of liability. 101
The position taken by the DOJ is misleading. First, United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. 102 and Utah Public Service Commission v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co.10 3 are pre-Tunney act cases; 10 4 it is difficult to
see where the casual use of the term "consent decree" has any bearing
on what Congress meant by "consent decree," when it passed the
Tunney Act many years later. 10 5  Second, the argument ignores the
significant legislative history discussed above. 10 6 Third, the leading
cases cited to by the DOJ in support of its position, that post-litigation
settlements are consent decrees, in fact, were not considered consent
decrees because they were given prima facie effect in subsequent treble
damage actions.
101. DOJ Reply Mem., supra note 78, at 13-14 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
102. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd in part,
rev 'd in part, and remanded by 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
103. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969) [hereinafter El
Paso II].
104. See infra notes 102-12 (discussing Paramount Pictures and its progeny); infra Part III.B
(discussing the litigation El Paso Natural Gas Co.).
105. The "consent decree" has been described by Congress as "an order of the court agreed
upon by representatives of the Attorney General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct
challenged by the Attorney General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, or related statutes." ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, at ix (Comm.
Print 1959). The Supreme Court has explained that, with a consent decree, parties
waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the
time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached
normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination
of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded
with the litigation.
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
106. See supra Part II (discussing the legislative history of the Tunney Act).
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The case of United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., whose
progeny is cited extensively by the DOJ, hardly could stand for the
proposition that decrees entered into after trial are consent decrees
within the meaning of the Tunney Act and devoid of prima facie effect
because the Paramount decree was given prima facie effect in
subsequent litigation. For example, in Harrison v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc.,10 7 the court instructed the jury as to the existence of the
Paramount decree:
[I]f the real purpose here was simply to favor the Warner theatre,
which was the Ardmore Theatre, for various reasons-you have heard
about the situation in Philadelphia where Warner had a tremendous
buying power, as did the Warner theatres all over the country, and the
condition of the whole industry, and the fact that these monopoly
powers undoubtedly did, or at least were found by the decree of the
court to exist-and if the sole purpose was not a reasonable business
purpose but was merely to keep a favored theatre ahead of a
competitor, then you could find that the clearances were unreasonable.
That is one of the things you must ask yourselves. 10 8
The prima facie effect of the Paramount decree was also an issue in
Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp.10 9 Although the
Supreme Court limited the admissibility of the decree in evidence to
issues actually determined in the prior litigation, the court did not state
that because the decree was entered post-litigation that such a decree
lacks prima facie effect on the issues litigated. 10 Thus, because the
decree was given prima facie effect for § 5(a) purposes,' 11 it was not
107. Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Penn. 1953). In fact, the
decree opened the floodgates for litigation against the motion picture industry. In 1951, 129 of
the 367 private antitrust suits brought were against the movie industry. See Comment, Antitrust
Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE
L.J. 1010, 1043 n.219 (1952).
108. Harrison, 115 F. Supp. at 314. The plaintiffs action, however, was dismissed based
upon standing arguments. Id. at 315.
109. Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 92 (1954).
110. See id. at 100-01. The prima facie effect of the decree entered only establishes the
illegality of the conduct litigated and found unlawful. See infra note 216 and accompanying text
(emphasizing how a primary goal of antitrust laws is to root-out illegal conduct). It does not
necessarily establish the additional elements a damage litigant must prove, like being within the
"target area" of the violation, a factual connection between the violation shown and the injury to
the plaintiff; demonstrating that the injury is the sort prohibited by the antitrust laws; and showing
with sufficient certainty the amount of injury or damage. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN &
WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 17.2 (2000).
111. The prima facie effect to be given to the Paramount decree was a hotly contested issue.
See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 539-44 (1954);
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Vill. Theatre, Inc., 228 F.2d 721, 726-27 (10th Cir. 1955);
Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86, 90 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 976 (1954); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269-70
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considered a "consent decree" within the meaning of § 5(a) of the
Clayton Act, nor would it have been for purposes of the Tunney Act.
112
B. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 113 also a
pre-Tunney Act decision, is sometimes cited for the proposition that the
DOJ can enter a consent decree at any time. 1l 4 Cascade involved the
review of a settlement proposal and motions to intervene pursuant to a
Supreme Court mandate that complete divestiture of illegally acquired
assets take place, not the review of a consent decree. The proposed
settlement reached after the reversal in Cascade was reversed once
again for a failure to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate. 1 15 The
Court recognized that the DOJ had authority to settle but that judicial
power could not be circumscribed by the process of settlement, much
less a consent decree:
We do not question the authority of the Attorney General to settle
suits after, as well as before, they reach here. The Department of
Justice, however, by stipulation or otherwise has no authority to
circumscribe the power of the courts to see that our mandate is carried
out. No one, except this Court, has authority to alter or modify our
mandate.... Our direction was that the District Court provide for
'divestiture without delay.' That mandate in the context of the opinion
plainly meant that Pacific Northwest or a new company be at once
restored to a position where it could compete with El Paso in the
California market. 116
Despite this clear holding in Utah Public Service Commission v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., Judge Kollar-Kotelly relied upon the case and
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); see also In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1110-11
n.46 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (noting that the government decree a had prima facie effect in the
subsequent private actions against Paramount but that the plaintiffs in each case were required to
show that their particular businesses had been injured by the defendant's actions).
112. The DOJ also engaged in an elaborate word count strategy, noting that the Fifth Circuit
and others referred to the decree as a "consent decree." Strangely, the Supreme Court only
referred to the decree as a "consent decree" once, calling it strictly a decree the remaining twenty-
eight times. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Of course, these
word counts are meaningless in interpreting the language of the Tunney Act, given that the cases
are pre-Tunney Act.
113. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
114. See 2 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 348a (1995)
(citing Cascade for the proposition that consent decrees may occur after an adjudication of
liability).
115. El Paso II, 395 U.S. 464 (1969). Professor Flynn appealed the settlement as amicus
curiae on the ground that the proposed settlement violated the Supreme Court's prior mandate
ordering complete divestiture.
116. Id. at 467 (quoting Cascade, 386 U.S. at 136) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 34
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Judge Skelly Wright's characterization of it as "perhaps the leading
atrocity of the whole litany of antitrust suits" 117 to hold that the Act "is
only effective if the proposed legislation is understood to apply to
settlements entered after testimony has been taken; otherwise, the El
Paso Natural Gas litigation would serve only to exemplify a problem
that the proposed legislation would not have resolved."11 8
The difficulty with the analysis of El Paso Natural Gas is that the
case turned on the adequacy of the remedy imposed after: (1) the
Supreme Court reversed a finding that the Federal Power Commission
had primary jurisdiction over the merger; 119 (2) the district court
dismissed the antitrust challenge to the merger on the merits; and (3)
the Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint1 2° for failure to comply with the Court's finding that the
merger was unlawful and order that divestiture be granted "without
delay."' 21 The decree that was then entered, pursuant to the Supreme
Court order, became the subject of further review by the Supreme
Court. The Court first held that the parties were improperly denied
intervention and that the decree did not comply with the Court's order
that the division of reserves fulfill its mandate for fairness.122 On
remand, the district court then entered an order choosing an applicant to
acquire the divested reserves and assets. 123  The Supreme Court
subsequently found that this order also failed to comply with its
outstanding mandate for complete divestiture and failed to apportion
fairly the divested assets between El Paso Natural Gas Co. and the new
company established by the lower court's order.124
Consequently, the El Paso Natural Gas case involved a decree
implementing a judgment of the Supreme Court, which was entered
after a lower court's dismissal of a DOJ complaint, finding the merger
unlawful. Notably, El Paso Natural Gas was not a case where there had
been a litigated finding of illegality by the trial court, but there was a
finding of illegality by the Supreme Court. Moreover, because
Congress enacted the Tunney Act after the Supreme Court decided the
El Paso Natural Gas case, reliance on the case to imply that the Tunney
117. 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973).
118. Microsoft 11: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting 119
CONG. REC. 24,598).
119. California v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
120. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 652, 662 (1964).
121. Id. at 662.
122. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 136 (1967).
123. El Paso II, 395 U.S. 464, 468 (1969) (describing the district court's order).
124. Id. at 469.
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Act applies to proposed settlements entered after a litigated finding of
illegality is misplaced. 125
C. United States v. AT&T
In United States v. AT&T, 126 after the enactment of the Tunney Act,
Judge Greene was confronted with an attempt to circumvent the district
court's power 27 to determine the appropriate remedy in an antitrust
case after litigation had taken place but before judgment had been
entered finding a violation. 128 After several weeks of trial, but before
the case was submitted for a verdict, the United States and AT&T
entered into a settlement agreement. 129 The parties then presented the
settlement to a New Jersey district court, where a previous consent
decree against AT&T had been entered, and simultaneously moved to
dismiss the case pending before Judge Greene. 130 The parties claimed
that the settlement was an amendment to the earlier consent decree and
that the Tunney Act did not apply to the agreement because it was not a
consent decree but rather an amendment to a pre-existing decree. 131
Judge Greene refused to dismiss the action pending in his court. 132
Judge Greene then was confronted with the issue of the appropriate
standard to apply to a case not litigated to judgment where the only
parties to the case proposed a settlement. 133 He found it "unnecessary
125. If the Tunney Act had been in place, the process for review of the decree entered on
remand after the reversal in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. and the trial court's
jurisdiction would have been based on § 15 of the Clayton Act, 14 U.S.C. § 25, because the
decree was one entered pursuant to a Supreme Court mandate in a merger case challenged under
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. Judge Kollar-Kotelly's noting that the Court in Cascade held that the
DOJ could settle suits both before and after they reached the Supreme Court, does not resolve the
issue of whether the jurisdiction and the process to be followed by a court reviewing such a
settlement is that mandated by the Tunney Act, by § 4 of the Sherman Act, or by § 15 of the
Clayton Act. See Microsoft I: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 n.6 (D.D.C. 2002).
In Microsoft I, it is clear from the face of the Tunney Act, the legislative history, and § 5(a) of
the Clayton Act that the only basis for the court's jurisdiction to enter a final judgment and decree
is § 4 of the Sherman Act. To hold otherwise would effectively read § 4 out of the Sherman Act
and render § 5(a) and § 5(e)(2) of the Clayton Act meaningless.
126. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
127. AT&T was, like Microsoft II, an attempt by the DOJ to circumvent the power of the court
to determine an appropriate remedy.
128. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 150.
129. Id. at 140-41.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 144. Judge Greene appropriately described the maneuver as "disingenuous." Id. at
145.
132. Id. at 141.
133. Id. at 143.
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for the court to pass specifically upon the technical applicability of the
Tunney Act."134 Instead, the judge entered an order under the general
equitable powers of the court applying the process set forth by the
Tunney Act to the settlement because the case had not been litigated to
the point of a judicial finding of liability. 135 In doing so, Judge Greene
recognized a significant implication of using the Tunney Act standard,
even though it was not clear that the Act should be followed in the
circumstances:
Where ... a court is evaluating a settlement, it is not as free to
exercise its discretion in fashioning a remedy as it would be upon a
finding of liability. For when parties enter into a consent decree, they
waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus
save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation....
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise;
in exchange for the cost and the elimination of risk, the parties each
give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the
litigation. If courts acting under the Tunney Act disapproved proposed
consent decrees merely because they did not contain the exact relief
which the court would have imposed after a finding of liability,
defendants would have no incentive to consent to judgment and this
element of compromise would be destroyed. The consent decree
would thus as a practical matter be eliminated as an enforcement tool,
despite Congress' directive that it be preserved .... It follows that a
lower standard of review must be applied in assessing proposed
consent decrees than would be appropriate in some other
circumstances.... For these reasons, it has been said by some courts
that a proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the
remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within
134. Id. at 145.
135. Id. Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not discuss Judge Greene's opinion in her decision holding
that the proposed settlement in Microsoft I was a consent decree despite its obvious relevance to
the question before the court. Instead, her opinion discussed the dissenting opinion of Justices
Rehnquist, Burger, and White from the Supreme Court's affirmation of Judge Greene's order on
appeal. Microsoft H: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2002). Like Judge
Greene, the dissenting Justices assumed that the concept of "consent decree" only applied to
settlements arrived at before litigation had taken place. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, after holding that
the opinion of dissenting justices was not binding on her, noted that the dissenters did not
distinguish between pre-trial settlements and post-trial settlements and held that the dissenting
opinion "does not itself render the Tunney Act inapplicable to these proceedings." AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. at 151-53. Such reasoning constitutes a series of multiple negatives: a decision not binding
on the court is relied upon for not distinguishing between pre- and post-trial settlements to
determine that the Tunney Act is not inapplicable to the case before the court. Such reasoning, of
course, does not establish the affirmative proposition that the Tunney Act is applicable to the
proceeding before the court.
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the range of acceptability or is "within the reaches of the public
interest." 136
Unlike the AT&T case, Microsoft 11 has been carried to a litigated
finding of liability-there are findings of fact and law from which the
court can determine the appropriate remedy.137 The DOJ and Microsoft
portrayed their proposal as a "consent decree" and assumed that the
process for the court to follow was that mandated by the Tunney Act.
The case, however, is a fully litigated case carried to final judgment,
there were other parties to the case, and it was a case subject to a
mandate by the court of appeals that a trial be held on the merits of a
proposed remedy. 138 Under the standards set forth by Judge Greene, it
is clear that Microsoft If, or any similar case in the future, is not an
appropriate case for use of Tunney Act standards because the case is
one litigated to final judgment.
In Microsoft II, the district court cited Judge Greene's opinion in the
AT&T case for the proposition that a "proposed decree must be
approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on
its own, as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is within
the reaches of public interest."' 139 Judge Greene, however, was careful
to condition this observation with the caveat, "[w]here, as here, a court
is evaluating a settlement, it is not as free to exercise its discretion in
fashioning a remedy as it would be upon a finding of liability."' 140
Moreover, under the mandate of the court of appeals in Microsoft II, the
136. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Judge Greene went on
to observe that, even under the lower standard implied by following the Tunney Act standard, a
court should not revert to the role of being a "rubber stamp" for the settlement arrived at by
parties that had prevailed prior to the Tunney Act. Id. Among the reasons for an independent
evaluation by the court under this lower standard, the court cited the importance of the case to the
economy, the familiarity of the court with the facts because the case had been partially litigated,
and the questionable circumstances that had taken place in the process by which the case was
settled. Id. at 151-53. Judge Green conditioned court approval on several modifications of the
decree and on-going judicial supervision of the implementation of the decree, thereby asserting
the independent power of the court to determine the final decree. Id. at 153.
137. See Microsoft I1: Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); Microsoft II:
Findings of Fact, 65 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
138. See Microsoft II: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
139. Microsoft H1: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 153 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting AT&T,
552 F. Supp. at 151). The court also cited United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.
1981), a case involving a consent decree entered without any litigation where the defendant was
seeking to escape entry of the decree after completion of the required Tunney Act proceedings,
for the proposition that it must defer to the DOJ. Microsoft 11: Memorandum Opinion, 215 F.
Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002). The case is similar to the first "Microsoft Fallacy" on the scope of the
trial court's discretion, but at least involved a consent decree entered before any litigation had
taken place and not a settlement entered after litigation to a final judgment of illegality had taken
place.
140. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151.
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presence of other parties to the case who objected to the proposed
settlement required that the remedy phase of the case be tried in open
court with a full opportunity for all parties to cross-examine witnesses
and present their own proposals for an appropriate remedy in a single
proceeding. 141
IV. ABUSE OF THE TUNNEY ACT: MISAPPLICATION OF THE SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MICROSOFT !
The first misapplication of the Tunney Act in the Microsoft series of
cases took place in 1995. In 1994, the DOJ brought a civil complaint
against Microsoft under § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging in part
that Microsoft had unlawfully maintained a monopoly of operating
systems for IBM-compatible personal computers ("PCs"). 142 The DOJ
claimed that Microsoft had restrained trade of the PCs unreasonably
through certain anticompetitive marketing practices. 143 These practices
included imposing a per-processor licensing fee that required original
equipment manufacturers to pay Microsoft a royalty for each computer
produced-regardless whether or not a Microsoft operating system was
on it-and overly restrictive nondisclosure agreements with certain
independent software vendors ("ISVs"), which limited the ISVs' ability
to provide software for competing operating systems. 144 The complaint
was filed with a consent decree. 145 The consent decree prohibited
Microsoft from engaging in these practices in the future. 146
The DOJ moved for entry of the decree in January 1995.147 Judge
Sporkin found that the consent decree was not in the public interest. 148
Specifically, Judge Sporkin was concerned about four things:
141. See infra Part VI.E (discussing the failure of the District Court in Microsoft II to
adequately protect the fight of the parties to propose remedies).
142. See Microsoft/, 159 F.R.D. 318, 322 (D.D.C. 1995).
143. Id. at 322-24.
144. Id.
145. See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement; United States of
America v. Microsoft Corporation, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,845 (Dep't Justice Aug. 19, 1994).
146. Id. at 42,845-46. The consent decree expired in the midst of the February 2000
Microsoft II remedy hearing without much fanfare. See id. at 42,857 (stating that the final
judgment will expire seventy-seven months after entry).
147. See Microsoft 1, 159 F.R.D. at 321.
148. Id. at 332.
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(1) procedure; 149 (2) scope of the decree; 150 (3) effectiveness of the
remedy; 151 and (4) compliance. 52
The D.C. Circuit reversed Judge Sporkin's decision in Microsoft I
and remanded the case to a different judge, Judge Jackson, believing
that Judge Sporkin would not be impartial on remand. 153 The court then
linked Tunney Act review to a standard of deference granted to
149. The court believed that it should have been apprised of the following:
(1) The broad contours of the investigation i.e., the particular practices and
conduct of the defendant that were under investigation along with the nature, scope and
intensity of the inquiry;
(2) With respect to such particular practices and conduct, what were the
conclusions reached by the Government;
(3) In the settlement discussions between the Government and defendant: (a) what
were the areas that were discussed, and (b) what, if any, areas were bargained away
and the reasons for their non-inclusion in the decree;
(4) With respect to the areas not discussed at the bargaining table or not bargained
away, what are the plans for the Government to deal with them i.e., is the investigation
to continue, and, if so, at what intensity, or if the investigation is to be closed, then the
Government must explain why it is in the public interest to do so. Basically, other than
being told the Government spent a great deal of time on a wide-ranging inquiry and
that the defendant is a tough bargainer, the Court has not been provided with the
essential information it needs to make its public interest finding.
Id.
150. See id. at 333.
The Court finds the decree on its face to be too narrow. Its coverage is restricted to PCs
with x86 or Intel x86 compatible microprocessors. The decree covers only MS-DOS
and Windows and its predecessor and successor products. Neither party has even
addressed the Court's concern that the decree be expanded to cover all of Microsoft's
commercially marketed operating systems. Given the pace of technological
change, the decree must anticipate covering operating systems developed for new
microprocessors.... In addition, taking into account Microsoft's penchant for
narrowly defining the antitrust laws, the Court fears there may be endless debate as to
whether a new operating system is covered by the decree.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
151. See id. at 333-36. Judge Sporkin believed the remedy to be ineffective because it did not
"effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendant['s] illegal
restraints." Id. at 333 (quoting AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 150 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)). Judge Sporkin was concerned that the decree
did nothing to address the allegation that Microsoft had engaged in vaporware-the practice of
prematurely announcing a new product to ensure that customers do not switch to a competitor's
wares. Id. at 334-36.
152. The court noted that Microsoft was not obliged to develop internal compliance
mechanisms to monitor the consent decree. Id. at 336.
153. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
[hereinafter Microsoft I: Appeal]. Interestingly, the Microsoft case is now on its third district
judge, the previous two being eliminated by the D.C. Circuit for precisely the same reason. See
Simon Moores, Has Mr. Toad Learned His Lesson Yet?, COMPUTER WKLY., Nov. 14, 2002, at 38
(discussing the third judge in the Microsoft case).
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administrative agencies. 154  Rather than making an independent
determination as to whether the consent decree was "in the public
interest," the standard mandated by Congress in the Tunney Act, 155 the
"appropriate" standard according to the court, was a deferential one:
The court should also bear in mind the flexibility of the public interest
inquiry: the court's function is not to determine whether the resulting
array of rights and liabilities "is the one that will best serve society,"
but only to confirm that the resulting settlement is "'within the
reaches of the public interest."' Thus, a court should not reject an
agreed-upon modification unless "it has exceptional confidence that
adverse antitrust consequences will result-perhaps akin to the
confidence that would justify a court in overturning the predictive
judgments of an administrative agency." 156
Thus, the court of appeals transformed the DOJ into an administrative
agency and endowed it with deference before reviewing courts-a
power neither typical to administrative agencies nor conferred by the
Tunney Act itself. Consequently, a district judge confronted with a
Tunney Act proceeding has minimal duties in the eyes of the court of
appeals. A district judge should only determine whether ambiguity
exists and, perhaps, "hesitate" or momentarily pause before signing a
consent decree when the objections of the victims of the conduct being
prohibited are still heard and the obvious plight of future victims is in
sight.' 57
154. See id. at 1459-60. "Even when a court is explicitly authorized to review government
action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 'there must be a strong showing of bad faith or
improper behavior' before the court may 'inquir[e] into the mental processes of administrative
decisionmakers."' Id. at 1459 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402,420 (1971)).
155. The "public interest" standard that the court is required to apply under § 5(e) of the
Tunney Act expressly states that the court "may" consider: (1) the "competitive impact" of the
proposed consent judgment, "including termination of alleged violations": (2) decree provisions
"for [the] enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought;" (3) the "anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually considered"; (4) other considerations "bearing upon the adequacy"
of the proposed decrees; (5) the impact of the proposed decree "upon the public generally" and
upon "individuals alleging specific injury"; and (6) the "public benefit, if any, to be derived from
a determination of issues at trial." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2000).
156. Microsoft I: Appeal, 56 F.3d at 1460 (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
157. See id. at 1462 (per curiam). The court explained:
If the decree is ambiguous, or the district judge can foresee difficulties in
implementation, we would expect the court to insist that these matters be attended to.
And, certainly, if third parties contend that they would be positively injured by the
decree, a district judge might well hesitate before assuming that the decree is
appropriate.
Id. (per curiain).
2003]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
Clearly, from the language of the Tunney Act and its legislative
history, this is precisely the sort of deferential standard the drafters of
the Tunney Act did not want. 158  The language of the Act expressly
provides that the court, not the DOJ, shall determine whether or not the
consent decree is in the public interest. 159 The language of the Act also
indicates that the court may consider numerous factors in its
determination, including whether the consent decree terminates the
alleged violations, if it provides mechanisms for enforcement, the
duration of relief sought, and the "anticipated effects of alternative
remedies actually considered." 160 In addition, § 5(f) provides extensive
powers for the court to explore the merits of the proposed decree,
powers that would be irrelevant if the court is required to defer to the
decision making of the DOJ. 161 In short, Judge Sporkin's concerns
raised issues well within the scope of the Tunney Act.
Moreover, the legislative history of the Tunney Act is filled with
statements decrying judicial rubber-stamping of consent decrees. 162 To
ignore this substantial legislative history and the express language of
§ 5(e) in favor of a deferential standard is to place the D.C. Circuit in
the position of an activist court rewriting legislation. Despite the
Tunney Act authors' and Congress's clear intent to insure that the courts
have discretion and an active role in the determination of the public
interest, 163 the D.C. Circuit chose to ignore legislative intent and cast
158. Senator Gurney, for example, made clear that the court's function in reviewing a
proposed consent decree was for the court to make its own determination as to whether the decree
was in the public interest:
The bill further requires that the court accept a proposed consent decree only after it
determines that to do so is in the public interest as defined by the antitrust laws of the
United States. The bill specifies criteria the court may consider in deciding whether the
judgment would in fact be in the public interest so defined. This is a particularly
important provision, since after entry of a consent decree it is often difficult for private
parties to recover redress for antitrust injuries.
119 CONG. REc. 24,600 (1973).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e). Section 16(e) states: "Before entering any consent judgment proposed
by the United States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment
is in the public interest." Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f).
162. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's desire to eliminate
courts' rubber-stamping of consent decrees proposed by the DOJ).
163. The affirmative purpose of requiring the filing of a competitive impact statement,
providing for public comment, and delaying entry of the decree for sixty days was to provide the
court with sufficient information to make an intelligent determination of whether the decree was
in the public interest. As Senator Gurney, a co-sponsor of the legislation, stated:
The extra time and additional information that the bill thus requires is for the
purpose of encouraging, and in some cases soliciting, additional information and public
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judicial review of consent decrees back to the days when rubber-
stamping was prevalent.164 Moreover, the standard adopted reopens the
potential for political abuse in the settlement of antitrust cases by
closed-door negotiation and the settlement of significant cases-one of
the very abuses Congress sought to end with the passage of the Tunney
Act.165 It is difficult to conceive of a more patent re-write of a law
Congress intended to prevent judges from rubber-stamping consent
decrees negotiated by the DOJ. The precedent established by
Microsoft I constitutes a clear abuse of the Tunney Act-the first
"Microsoft Fallacy"-and should be rejected by any other court called
upon to interpret the scope of judicial review of consent decrees
proposed by the DOJ under the Tunney Act.
V. INTERMISSION: TRIAL, REMAND, AND THE
SECOND MICROSOFT FALLACY
Soon after Microsoft I, the DOJ and Microsoft became entangled in a
series of trials and "errors." Specifically, the DOJ brought a contempt
action against Microsoft for tying its Internet browser to its operating
system, in claimed violation of the Microsoft I consent decree. 166 Judge
Jackson, the second of the three judges to oversee the Microsoft line of
cases, interpreted the decree as one designed to prohibit unlawful tying
arrangements under general antitrust tying standards, and issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Microsoft from tying its Internet
Explorer application with its Windows operating system. 167 The court
comment that will assist the court in deciding whether the decree should be
granted....
The bill further requires that the court accept a proposed consent decree only after
it determines that to do so is in the public interest as defined by the antitrust laws of the
United States.
119 CONG. REC. 24,600 (1973).
164. See James Rob Savin, Tunney Act '96: Two Decades of Judicial Misapplication, 46
EMORY L.J. 363, 366-71 (1997) (discussing the standard of review prevalent before the Tunney
Act was passed); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's desire to
eliminate the courts' rubber-stamping of consent decrees proposed by the DOJ).
165. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intent to expose
the settlement process to public scrutiny).
166. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.D.C. 1997).
167. Id. at 542-44. Judge Jackson found the term "integrated products," in the following
language of the consent decree, ambiguous when it came to bundling Microsoft's operating
system with its Internet browser program:
Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of that
agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon: (i) the licensing of any other
Covered Product, Operating System Software product or other product (provided,
however, that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft
from developing integrated products).
2003]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
of appeals reversed. 168  Prior to the decision by the court of
appeals, however, the DOJ brought a monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and exclusive dealing and tying case against
Microsoft. 169 The result was a trial with conclusions of law, findings of
fact, and yet another appeal. 170  Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
majority of the findings of facts and conclusions of law by Judge
Jackson on monopolization, but reversed Jackson's attempted
monopolization and tying analyses and his remedy ordering structural
relief.171 The D.C. Circuit, citing improper communications with the
press prior to issuance of Judge Jackson's opinion, remanded the case
for determination of remedy to Judge Kollar-Kotelly. 172 Of particular
note was the displeasure of the D.C. Circuit that Judge Jackson failed to
hold a remedy hearing prior to ordering divestiture of Microsoft's
operating system from the rest of the company. 173
On remand, Judge Kollar-Kotelly, after and because of the events of
September 11, 2001, strongly urged the parties to settle. 174  The DOJ
and nine states eventually settled with Microsoft. 175  The parties
negotiated the settlement in secret and presented the agreement to Judge
Id. at 539 n.2, 541. But, he found that the bundling likely violated the general antitrust law
prohibition against tying arrangements under § I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 542-45.
168. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
169. The DOJ filed the monopolization complaint on May 18, 1998. Complaint, Microsoft I,
159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f1700/1763.htm (last visited May 8, 2003). The D.C. Circuit ruled in the Microsoft ! matter on
June 23, 1998. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 935.
170. See Microsoft II: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
171. See id.
172. Microsoft 1: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002).
173. Microsoft H: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 101-03.
174. See Order Filed Sept. 28, 2001, at 1-2, Microsoft 11: Review of Proposed Final
Judgment, No. CIV.A.98-1232 (CKK), New York v. Microsoft, No. CIV.A.98-1233 (CKK)
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/98-1232gg.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2003). The order gave the parties until October 12, 2001, to settle the cases on their own.
Id. at 2. Failing that, the court required that the parties submit the name of a mediator. Id. Judge
Kollar-Kotelly's primary concern was September 11: "In light of the recent tragic events affecting
our Nation, this Court regards the benefit which will be derived from quick settlement of this case
as increasingly significant." Id. at 1. In the realm of antitrust remedy, the remedy's short-term
effect on the economy is of no consequence.
Economic hardship can influence choice only as among two or more effective
remedies. If the remedy chosen is not effective, it will not be saved because an
effective remedy would entail harsh consequences. This proposition is not novel; it is
deeply rooted in antitrust law and has never been successfully challenged.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 327 (1961).
175. The following states settled with Microsoft: Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Illinois. See Microsoft 11: Final Judgment,
231 F. Supp. 2d at 151 n. 1. The District of Columbia and the states of California, Connecticut,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Utah continued to litigate.
The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act
Kollar-Kotelly as a consent decree 176 under the Tunney Act but did not
have trial staff sign it. 177 The split between the plaintiffs and the
remedy hearing required to litigate the non-settling states' case caused
Judge Kollar-Kotelly to bifurcate the trial of the litigating states and the
settlement between Microsoft and the DOJ into two separate
proceedings. 178 The bifurcation of the remedy proceeding, as will be
shown below, only further complicated the already complex problem of
determining the appropriate remedy for the violation established in
Microsoft 11.179 Instead of holding a unified trial on the appropriate
remedy, the court reviewed the DOJ's "consent decree" with Microsoft
under the standards of the first "Microsoft Fallacy," deferring at every
turn to the discretion of the DOJ, to enter the settlement despite
occasional indications of reservation by the court. 180 Thus, the first
"Microsoft Fallacy" was married to the second "Microsoft Fallacy," to
rubber-stamp a settlement proposal entered into by secret negotiations
after fully litigating the case to a final judgment.
VI. MISUSE OF THE TUNNEY ACT: THE DOJ-PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT
MISLABELED A "CONSENT DECREE" IN MICROSOFT II
The issues raised by the review process followed by the district court
and its holding-that the proposed remedy filed by the DOJ, Microsoft,
and nine states was a "consent decree" for Tunney Act purposes in the
remedy phase of Microsoft I-are more than a mere procedural quibble.
They raise serious jurisdictional questions and portend consequences
that will make any decree entered pursuant to the process, which now
appears to be in place, vulnerable to an appeal and reversal. Moreover,
176. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text (examining Judge Kollar-Kotelly's
decision to treat the proposed settlement as a consent decree).
177. See John Wilke, Hard Drive: Negotiating All Night, Tenacious Microsoft Won Mans
,
Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at Al. It is unusual for trial staff not to have a single
signature on any of the filed settlement documents apart from the competitive impact statement.
For an example, consider the pleadings and settlement documents from United States v.
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 97-CV-6294T), which
are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/indx23.htm. (last visited May 8, 2003).
178. See United States v. Microsoft, No. CIV.A.98-1232, 2002 WL 319784, at *1 (D.D.C.
Jan. 28, 2001).
179. See supra note 14 (discussing the components of the Microsoft II litigation).
180. At the outset of her opinion and in reliance on the first Microsoft case, Judge Kollar-
Kotelly stated that "the Court must recall that its 'authority to review the [proposed] decree
depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in
the first place.' Accordingly, the Court must accord deference to the 'government's predictions
as to the effect of the proposed remedies."' New York v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209
(D.D.C. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Microsoft I: Appeal, 56 F.3d 1448, 1461-62
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
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the court's holding establishes an improper precedent for litigated
antitrust case remedy proceedings and the effective use of consent
decrees in the future. These issues are addressed below.
A. The Law of the Case
The refusal of Judge Kollar-Kotelly to hold a unified and open
hearing where all parties would have had an equal opportunity to
present proposed remedies, due to the DOJ's misapplication of the
Tunney Act, replicated the error previously committed by Judge
Jackson, which the court of appeals found to deprive parties of a hearing
on remedy and violated what is now the law of the case. The court of
appeals held in remand of the case:
It is a cardinal principle of our system of justice that factual disputes
must be heard in open court and resolved through trial-like evidentiary
proceedings. Any other course would be contrary "to the spirit which
imbues our judicial tribunals prohibiting decision without hearing."
A party has the right to a judicial resolution of disputed facts not
just to the liability phase, but also as to appropriate relief....
("Generally the entry or continuation of an injunction requires a
hearing. Only when the facts are not in dispute, or when the adverse
party has waived its right to a hearing, can that significant procedural
step be eliminated.". . . A hearing on the merits-i.e., a trial on
liability-does not substitute for a relief-specific evidentiary hearing
unless the matter of relief was part of the trial on liability, or unless
there are no disputed factual issues regarding the matter of relief.
This rule is no less applicable in antitrust cases. The Supreme
Court "has recognized that a 'full exploration of facts is usually
necessary in order (for the District Court) properly to draw (an
antitrust) decree' so as to 'prevent future violations and eradicate
existing evils."' . . . Hence a remedies decree must be vacated
whenever there is "a bona fide disagreement concerning substantive
items of relief which could be resolved only by trial." 181
Consequently, those parties dissenting from the remedy proposed by the
DOJ and Microsoft were entitled to have their own proposals evaluated
on the merits by the court at trial because the DOJ proceeding was not a
consent decree proceeding and the law of the case mandates that the
district court follow such a procedure. The separate trial of the remedy
issues presented by the dissenting states, while generating a lengthy
record and opinion by the court, was necessarily cabined by the court's
181. Microsoft 11: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34, 101 (D.C. Cir.) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
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approval of the "consent decree" in the DOJ remedy case. 182 Working
from the remedy drafted by the DOJ and Microsoft, which the trial
judge determined to be a Tunney Act consent decree subject to review
under the standards of the first "Microsoft Fallacy" by the court of
appeals, made the dissenting states' separate proceeding a useless
exercise. The mandate of the court of appeals and § 4 of the Sherman
Act required that Judge Kollar-Kotelly make her own independent
judgment of the remedy necessary to prevent and restrain the violations
found, with no special deference given to the proposal of the DOJ and
some of the parties. 183  Judge Kollar-Kotelly's two-track proceeding
violated the express mandate of the court of appeals because the
procedure would result in a remedy being imposed in one proceeding
under one standard (the Tunney Act) and another being imposed in a
second proceeding under the standards of § 4 of the Sherman Act. 184
The court of appeals, in fact, mandated otherwise, however, and the trial
court was not free to hold a separate hearing based on the standards of
the Tunney Act. 185
The parties to the case who did not take part in the settlement
proposed by some of the others were not only entitled to a trial
"concerning the substantive items of relief," proposed by the DOJ,
Microsoft, and some states, 186 but also should have been permitted to
propose their own remedies in the same trial-independent of those
proposed by the government-for the consideration by the court. In this
proceeding, the court would determine whether the suggested remedies
addressed present violations and prevented future violations of the Act
by the defendant. Then the court, under § 4 of the Sherman Act, would
determine the appropriate remedy without any special deference given
182. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002). At every turn, the
court rejected the dissenting states' attempts to close loopholes in the proposed government
decree, expand the decree to deal with threats to new markets by Microsoft, address the problem
of Microsoft's "bundling" of programs left largely unresolved by the proposed government
settlement, protect middleware markets, etc. Instead of working with a variety of proposed
remedies, the court appeared to be working from the position of whether the government's
proposed settlement complied with the narrowest interpretations of the court of appeals findings
of liability.
183. See infra Part VI.E (discussing two-track proceedings). The trial court did engage in a
general review of the standards applied by courts when determining an antitrust remedy. See id.
at 99-110. The court then systematically rejected each of the major remedy proposals made by
the dissenting states, including remedies to deal with Microsoft's bundling practices. Id. at 184-
91.
184. See generally Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 76. The problems inherent in such a
two-track analysis are discussed infra, Part VI.E.
185. See infra Part VI.E (discussing two-track proceedings).
186. Microsoft I1: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 101.
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to the claimed "consent decree" proposed by some of the parties. The
opinions of the district court on remedy hewed closely to the narrowest
reading of the findings of violation, affirmed by the court of appeals, to
prevent a recurrence of the past violations engaged in by Microsoft but
did little by way of "preventing or restraining" future violations of the
same character or eliminate practices like the bundling of software.
B. Separation of Powers
The process followed in negotiating the proposed Microsoft "consent
decree," not only took place in secret, 187 after litigation of the federal
and state claims, but also after a final judgment by the court, finding
that the defendant violated § 2 of the Sherman Act and a remand by the
court of appeals requiring "judicial resolution" of the case.188 A basic
function of the judiciary is to determine and implement the remedy for
the antitrust violations found pursuant to a final, litigated judgment. 189
Where the judiciary does not perform this function, serious issues
concerning separation of powers will later arise concerning the integrity
of any final remedy imposed. The judicial function is compromised
when two of the twenty parties to a litigated case are permitted to
negotiate and define the initial parameters of the decree, 190 which the
court is responsible for determining only after open hearings in court.
This procedure vests the executive branch with a judicial power that
Congress had reserved for the courts in § 4 of the Sherman Act. 191 It
also deprives other parties to the lawsuit of rights guaranteed them by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not to mention the specific
mandate of the court of appeals in Microsoft H.192 For the parties and
187. See Wilke, supra note 177 (noting that Assistant Attorney General Charles James
sometimes negotiated one-on-one with Chief Microsoft negotiator Charles Rule). The plaintiff
States were left to either sign on to something they had no part of or to continue with litigation.
See supra note 175 (listing those states that settled and identifying the states that chose to
continue litigating). Such a process also raised the specter of undue political interference in the
settlement negotiations, a concern driving the adoption of the Tunney Act and the 15 U.S.C. §
16(g) requirement that the defendant disclose any written or oral communications with any
offices or employee of the United States.
188. See generally Microsoft 11: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 534 U.S. 952
(2001).
189. See id. at 101.
190. See Wilke, supra note 177.
191. As the Supreme Court held in Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., "the Department of Justice... by stipulation or otherwise has no authority to circumscribe
the power of the courts to see that our mandate is carried out." El Paso II, 395 U.S. 464, 467
(1969). By the same token, the DOJ has no authority, by stipulation or otherwise, to circumscribe
the power of the trial court to carry out the mandate of the court of appeals in Microsoft H1 or the
power Congress expressly conferred on the court through § 4 of the Sherman Act.
192. See Microsoft I1: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 34.
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the court to ignore the clear statutory allocation of powers by treating
the remedy phase of a litigated antitrust case as one requiring a Tunney
Act consent decree process, particularly under the erroneous standards
of the first "Microsoft Fallacy," raises a substantial separation of powers
issue. Whether analyzed under a "formal," "functional," 193 or other
approach, 194 separation of power concerns arise when an executive
agency assumes certain powers that Congress expressly reserved for the
judiciary, and a court tolerates the assumption.
Executive and judicial powers have been intermingled in the realm of
government antitrust enforcement for a long time as a result of the
widespread use of consent decrees as an enforcement tool in civil cases
and nolo contendere pleas to settle criminal cases without formal
litigation of the charges. 195  Such a state of affairs is, of course,
unavoidable because Congress has bestowed the executive branch with
the power to initiate civil or criminal cases in order to enforce the
antitrust laws and has endowed the judiciary with the power to apply
criminal sanctions and equitable relief by entry of judgments of
illegality and decrees imposing a remedy.196 The clear statutory scheme
of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act leaves to the discretion of
the Attorney General the power to initiate and voluntarily dismiss
criminal or civil cases, while leaving to the judiciary the power to
determine the appropriate remedy in criminal and civil cases-whether
by a plea of nolo contendere, or a conviction upon trial in criminal
cases, or entry of an injunction in a civil case by consent or by
litigation. 197  Consent decrees require a judicial act and become an
193. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 488-89 (1987); Michael L.
Yoder, Note, Separation of Powers: No Longer Simply Hanging in the Balance, 79 GEO. L.J.
173, 175-82 (1990); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation:
Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 407-09 (1989)
(discussing the increasing controversy over separation of powers).
194. See E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 529-32 (1989) (proposing an "interactive" approach to separation of
power jurisprudence).
195. The complex issue of "separation of powers" in this instance should be understood as a
case of "intermingled powers." See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 2-5 (3d ed. 2000).
196. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 4 (2000). Sections 1 and 2 of Zhe Sherman Act, id. §§ 1-2,
provide for fines and jail sentences, and § 4 of the Sherman Act authorizes the United States
Attorneys under the direction of the Attorney General to seek equitable relief to "prevent and
restrain ... violations," id. § 4.
197. See Andrew B. Loewenstein, Judicial Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 351 (2001) ("[W]hen Congress enacts a binding legal standard, the
doctrine of separation of powers, rather than requiring unquestioning judicial deference to the
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injunction of a court once entered. As a judicial act imposing injunctive
relief, consent decrees, like litigated injunctions, are subject to potential
future judicial proceedings by way of a contempt action. 198 Both the act
of deciding to enter a decree and the act of deciding whether to enforce
the decree by a contempt citation are judicial functions and not
executive branch functions entrusted solely to the discretion of the DOJ.
Although the DOJ certainly has the right to dismiss a civil or criminal
antitrust complaint or negotiate a settlement with Microsoft or any other
party, the right of prosecutorial discretion ends when either: (1) a court
is asked to exercise its power to enter a consent decree, or (2) where
there is a litigated final judgment of illegality and the court is asked to
enter an injunction or punish the illegal conduct. Entry of both the
judgment and a remedy decree are judicial functions, subject to the
court's full equitable powers, regardless of whether the decree is a
consent decree within the meaning of the Tunney Act 199 or a litigated
Executive's prosecutorial decision-making, instead affirmatively permits the courts to assert their
own constitutionally granted right to 'say what the law is."').
198. The earlier action against Microsoft for alleged violations of the consent decree was by
way of a contempt action. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing United
States v. Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.D.C. 1997), contempt action).
199. See Savin, supra 164, at 377 n.102. Concerning judicial power, James Savin writes:
[A] denial of the court's power to refuse to enter decrees that do not protect the public
interest could itself represent an unconstitutional infringement on judicial power. Such
a denial would arguably prevent the court from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned function of enforcing the laws ... as a court of equity.
Id.
Concerning the "public interest" at stake, another commentator writes:
[T]he argument for deference made by the Justice Department and Microsoft fails to
consider the courts' inherent equitable power to reject the entry of judgments that
contravene the public interest. Although negotiations involve administrative decisions
by the government, a court's entry of a consent decree is a judicial act which is both
constitutional and statutory in nature. Thus, an intensive review of a consent decree by
a district court may be supported apart from the Tunney Act.
Krodel, supra note 39, at 1326; see also Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust
Consent Decrees, and the Need for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6,
38-40 (1996) (arguing for more flexible judicial review of consent decrees).
Other authors believe that separation of powers analysis argues in favor of judicial deference.
See, e.g., Ronald G. Carr, The Tunney Act Revisited: Some Observations on the Tunney Act, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 961 (1983); Joshua C. Teitelbaum, The Scope and Constitutionality of
Judicial Review Under the Tunney Act: United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir.
1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 941, 947 (1996) ("[linsofar as the public interest review
mandated by the Tunney Act authorizes a district court to review an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, it transfers an executive function and political question to the judicial branch, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers."); Greg Staton, Comment, Microsoft and the
Tunney Act: All Is Not Constitutional on the Western Front, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 405
(1996) (suggesting the public interest standard in the Tunney Act is ambiguous and that
"[w]ithout a judicially manageable standard, a political question emerges"). This is also the
position the DOJ and Microsoft have consistently taken in their consent decree in 1995 and their
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judgment. Moreover, Congress specifically designed the Tunney Act to
deal with the practice of excessive deference to the judgment of the
DOJ in establishing the terms of a consent decree and to stop the
practice of courts rubber-stamping the DOJ's proposed injunctive
relief.200  Congress mandated that the courts consider the public
interest, not whether the DOJ achieved what it considered to be in the
public interest when designing the appropriate relief, when deciding
whether or not to enter a decree. 20 1 Although recognizing Congress's
concern with courts rubber-stamping consent decrees negotiated by the
DOJ, the trial court in Microsoft H proceeded to do so by giving
deference to the "consent decree" negotiated by the DOJ under a
confused standard of deference:
"[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the
remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within
the range of acceptability or is within the reaches of public interest."
... [T]he Court cannot overlook the fact that the appellate court
sustained liability against Microsoft for violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Therefore, without applying a wholly distinct standard,
this Court must remain ever-mindful of the posture of this case when
assessing the proposed consent decree for determination of the public
interest.
Given the liability findings, part of the public interest analysis will
require consideration of the extent to which the proposed consent
proposed final judgment in 2002. Although the decision to propose a consent decree may be
within the prosecutorial discretion of the DOJ, the determination of whether to adopt the decree is
within the judicial discretion of the court. Requiring the court to consider the "public interest" in
a true Tunney Act proceeding is no more a "political question" than is the requirement in § 4 of
the Sherman Act that a court determine a remedy that both "prevents" and "restrains" present and
future violations. Under a "functional approach" to the separation of powers issue, the functions
of each branch "can be determined by balancing the specific public policies involved against the
possible disruption to the traditional exercise of power by a particular branch." Yoder, supra note
193, at 179.
200. See supra Part 11 (discussing the Tunney Act in relation to this practice).
201. See supra text accompanying note 61 (quoting Senator Tunney as mandating the court to
independently assure itself that a proposed decree serves the public interest). An underlying
concern of separation of powers jurisprudence is the "encroachment and aggrandizement" caused
by the "hydraulic pressure inherent with each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits
of its power." INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). This concern was one shared by
Congress in enacting the Tunney Act-that the DOJ was aggrandizing its power in resolving civil
antitrust cases by presenting them to a court with little or no explanation and asking the court to
adopt the proposed decree. See supra Part II (discussing judicial "rubber-stamping" of consent
decrees). By requiring the filing of a competitive impact statement and providing for public
comment, Congress sought to enable the courts to make an informed judgment on whether to
exercise the court's discretion to enter, modify, or reject the proposed decree in light of the
court's general obligation to adopt a decree which "prevents and restrains" violations of the
antitrust laws by the defendant.
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decree "meets the requirements for an antitrust remedy." "A remedies
decree in an antitrust case must seek to 'unfetter a market from
anticompetitive conduct,' to 'terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to
the defendants the fruits of the statutory violation, and ensure that
there remains no practices likely to result in monopolization in the
future."' Although this inquiry is usually reserved for cases which are
litigated through remedy, ... consideration of these "objectives," to
the extent they are applicable to the facts of this case, remains
appropriate because liability has been established in this case. Still,
the Court's assessment of the remedy's ability to satisfy these
objectives is tempered by the deference owed to the government in the
Tunney Act context.
20 2
Whatever may be said concerning the intermingling of executive and
judicial functions in the consent decree process and the appropriate
standard of review for Tunney Act consent decrees, Congress
specifically delegated the power of determining the equitable remedy in
litigated government civil antitrust cases to the courts under § 4 of the
Sherman Act. 20 3 The wisdom, effectiveness, and necessity of specific
remedies are choices Congress has reserved to the courts in litigated
antitrust suits. Congress did not give the DOJ the right to determine the
remedy in a litigated case by submitting a proposed consent decree in
circumstances where a consent decree is entirely inappropriate. 204
202. Microsoft II: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
203. Section 4 of the Sherman Act reads:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this title; and it shall be the duty of the
several United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the
Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and
praying such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties
complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as
soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition
and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining
order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
204. The use of the Tunney Act is limited to cases where there has not been "any testimony
taken." Id. § 16(a). The Tunney Act is limited to cases of proposed settlements where the court
must determine "the public benefit, if any, from a determination of the issues at trial" under
§ 5(e)(2) of the Clayton Act. Id. § 16(e)(2). The Tunney Act is clearly not applicable to cases
where there has been a fully litigated final judgment of illegality. See id. § 16(a). Section 5(h)
makes the competitive impact statement and proceedings to determine whether the "public
interest" is served by entry of the proposed decree inadmissible in subsequent treble damage
actions; evidence that is otherwise admissible in fully litigated cases. Id. § 16(h). Section 5(e)(2)
evidences a clear intent to limit consent decrees to cases where there has been no trial by
requiring the court to determine whether the public interest would be served by "a determination
of the issues at trial." Id. § 16(e)(2).
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Although the DOJ and a defendant may propose a remedy in such
circumstances, the court cannot abdicate its statutory responsibility to
determine the appropriate remedy under § 4 of the Sherman Act in order
to defer to the DOJ where the case is a fully litigated one.
20 5
If the courts were to unconstitutionally abdicate their statutory
responsibility in favor of deference to the DOJ, certain third parties
would be affected adversely. Other parties to the lawsuit are entitled to
have their proposed remedies and comments considered on an equal
footing with those of the DOJ and an antitrust defendant in open court,
in a single trial, and with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
They are entitled to have the court, not some of the parties, determine
the appropriate remedy without giving any special deference to the
remedy proposed by the DOJ or other parties. Where the injunctive
relief is imposed after testimony is taken, private parties are also
entitled to use the proceedings on remedy in subsequent treble damage
actions pursuant to the specific language of § 5(a) of the Clayton Act.20 6
In summary, the DOJ has the discretion to file and voluntarily
dismiss antitrust cases as an exercise of the prosecutorial discretion
committed to the DOJ by Congress. If a filed civil case proceeds to the
point of a consent decree being proposed for approval by a court before
any testimony is taken, then the court is instructed by Congress to make
its own determination of whether the proposed decree is "in the public
interest" under the standards set forth in § 5(e) of the Tunney Act and in
light of the competitive impact statement filed and public comments
made about the decree. Section 5(f) of the Tunney Act provides
extensive means for the court to seek assistance in fulfilling its
independent function required by § 5(e) in evaluating the proposed
decree. 20 7 If litigation of the case takes place and a decree is then
proposed or the case is pursued to a final judgment of liability, Congress
requires the court to make its own determination of the appropriate
remedy based on the record and without deference to the proposals of
205. See Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145-46 (1888) ("[T]he equitable powers of the
courts of the United States, sitting as courts of law, over their own process, to prevent abuse,
oppression, and injustice, are inherent, and as extensive and efficient as may be required by the
necessity for their exercise .... ).
206. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a). This interpretation of § 5(a) is supported by § 5(h), 15 U.S.C. §
16(h), of the Tunney Act amendment, which specifically excludes from the prima facie effect of
§ 5(a) the Competitive Impact Statement and court proceedings in a true consent decree
proceeding. If the remedy proceeding is not a true consent decree proceeding, the obvious
inference is that the hearings on remedy and materials submitted in those proceedings are
admissible in subsequent treble damage proceedings. See id.
207. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f).
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the DOJ.2 °8 Although the court may require filings similar to those
provided for by the Tunney Act to aid it in making its own Sherman Act
§ 4 determination pursuant to its general equitable powers, as Judge
Greene did in AT&T,209 the proceeding in a litigated case is not a
consent decree proceeding but rather the independent act of the
judiciary to determine the remedy in a litigated antitrust case.210  To
permit the DOJ and the defendant to dictate the remedy in a litigated
antitrust case by pretending their proposed decree is a consent decree,
and that the court's discretion is somehow restricted in the
circumstances of a litigated case by deference owed to the DOJ, violates
the statutory scheme set forth by Congress. It also raises the specter of
a violation of the inherent separation of judicial and executive powers,
as well as the specific separation of those powers mandated by Congress
under the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act in determining the remedy
for conduct found illegal under the antitrust laws.211
C. Scope of the Trial Court's Discretion
By portraying the proposed final judgment as a consent decree,
Microsoft and the DOJ sought to have the court defer to their proposed
remedy. By holding that the proposed settlement was a Tunney Act
consent decree, the district court implicitly agreed to limit its discretion
to review the propriety of the proposed settlement under the standards
of the first "Microsoft Fallacy," imposed earlier by the court of appeals,
and unlawfully narrowed the scope of its power to determine the
appropriate remedy. As noted above, the standard for a district court in
considering whether to adopt a remedy in a Tunney Act proceeding is
one which requires some deference to the decision of the DOJ to settle
rather than to litigate a pending antitrust case. Although deference
subject to a general "public interest" standard like that found in § 5(e) of
the Tunney Act may be justified in cases where the trial court has no
record to look to other than the disclosures mandated by the Tunney
Act, the same policies do not apply to a fully litigated case.2 12
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
209. See supra Part III.C (discussing Judge Greene's decision in AT&T).
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f).
211. This discussion serves as the basis for our proposal infra at Part VII.B.
212. The Tunney Act, however, provides mechanisms by which a judge might explore the
scope, meaning, and wisdom of a proposed consent decree in a Tunney Act proceeding. Section
5(f) of the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(f), provides:
In making its determination under subsection (e) of this section, the court may-
(1) take testimony of Government officials or experts or such other expert
witnesses, upon motion of any party or participant or upon its own motion, as the court
may deem appropriate;
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The record in a litigated case, like Microsoft II, and the final findings
of fact and law are clear. Therefore, the court has no need to defer to
the judgment of some of the twenty parties to the case in deciding the
appropriate remedy. Doing so substantially reduces the incentives of
defendants to enter into consent decrees at the beginning of significant
antitrust litigation in violation of the intent of Congress2 13-particularly
during important litigation involving an organization fundamental to the
economy and at risk of having significant structural remedies imposed.
If a defendant can litigate a case fully, lose, and then enter into a
negotiated settlement and have it labeled a "consent decree," what does
the defendant lose by litigating the case? Deference to the parties in
deciding a remedy also increases the risk of attempts to use undue
political influence, like those that caused Congress to adopt the Tunney
Act for consent decrees where no litigation has taken place, to resolve
fully litigated antitrust cases in which a defendant held liable may lose
the battle but win the war by negotiating a toothless remedy and
labeling it a "consent decree." 214  Moreover, allowing such a process
would result in an application of an inappropriate and lesser standard of
review instead of subjecting the proposal to an independent
determination of what remedy is necessary both to prevent and to
restrain the violations.
(2) appoint a special master and such outside consultants or expert
witnesses as the court may deem appropriate; and request and obtain the views,
evaluations, or advice of any individual, group or agency of government with respect
to any aspects of the proposed judgment or the effect of such judgment, in such manner
as the court deems appropriate;
(3) authorize full or limited participation in proceedings before the court
by interested persons or agencies, including appearance amicus curiae, intervention as
a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, examination of witnesses or
documentary materials, or participation in any other manner and extent which serves
the public interest as the court may deem appropriate;
(4) review any comments including any objections filed with the United
States under subsection (d) of this section concerning the proposed judgment and the
responses of the United States to such comments and objections; and
(5) take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem
appropriate.
15 U.S.C. § 16(0.
213. See supra Part II (discussing Congressional intent behind passage of the Tunney Act).
214. Preventing manipulation of the consent decree process in this way was a primary
objective of the Tunney Act and one that can be circumvented by negotiating a decree and then
drafting the complaint to fit the decree. See Savin, supra note 164, at 387.
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An appropriate remedy not only must restrain "existing evils," but
also must "prevent future violations." 215  As the court of appeals
explained in Microsoft H:
The Supreme Court has explained that a remedies decree in an
antitrust case must seek to "unfetter a market from anticompetitive
conduct,"... to "terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the
defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there
remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the
future ..... " 216
215. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 22 (1945). The Supreme Court has held
that after a district court has found that a violation of the antitrust laws exists,
[the court] has the duty to compel action by the conspirators that will, so far as
practicable, cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public freedom
from its continuance. Such action is not limited to prohibition of the proven means by
which the evil was accomplished, but may range broadly through practices connected
with acts actually found to be illegal. Acts entirely proper when viewed alone may be
prohibited. The conspirators should, so far as practicable, be denied future benefits
from their forbidden conduct.
... [Rielief, to be effective, must go beyond the narrow limits of the proven
violation.
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88-90 (1950).
216. Microsoft I1: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). In
United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court explained:
The proper disposition of antitrust cases is obviously of great public importance, and
their remedial phase, morc often than not, is crucial. For the suit has been a futile
exercise if the Government proves a violation but fails to secure a remedy adequate to
redress it. "A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open
to competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints. If this
decree accomplishes less than that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a
cause."
United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323-24 (1961) (quoting Int'l Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)); see also id. at 366 n.12 ("'In general the object
of the remedies under the antitrust laws is to prevent the continuance of wrongful conduct, and to
deprive the wrongdoers of the fruits of their unlawful conduct, and to prevent the creation anew
of restraint forbidden by law."' (quoting United States v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp.
356, 357 (D.C. Mass. 1957))); Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253
(1959) ("The decree should (1) put 'an end to the combination or conspiracy when that is itself
the violation'; (2) deprive 'the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy'; and (3)
'break up or render impotent the monopoly power which violates the Act."' (quoting Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948))). Schine Chain Theatres
also stands for the proposition that remedies should deprive the monopolist of the fruits of its
unlawful conduct.
With respect to maintaining the fruits of unlawful conduct, the Supreme Court has said:
In this type of case we start from the premise that an injunction against future
violations is not adequate to protect the public interest. If all that was done was to
forbid a repetition of the illegal conduct, those who had unlawfully built their empires
could preserve them intact. They could retain the full dividends of their monopolistic
practices and profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which they had inflicted on
competitors. Such a course would make enforcement of the Act a futile thing unless
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The Microsoft H court could only fulfill these requirements after a
trial in a single court proceeding where all of the parties to the case had
an equal opportunity to present their remedy proposals and have them
fairly evaluated by the court as required by § 4 of the Sherman Act, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the mandate of the court of
appeals in Microsoft H. Instead, the district court bifurcated the trial of
the dissenting states from review of the proposed consent decree and
adopted a confused standard of review of the proposed consent decree
by recognizing the case was a fully litigated case, yet believing the
scope of its discretion "is tempered by the deference owed to the
government in the Tunney Act context. '"217 Thus, the second
"Microsoft Fallacy"-that a proposed settlement after a fully litigated
case is a Tunney Act consent decree-was combined with the first
"Microsoft Fallacy"-that a court reviewing a Tunney Act consent
decree must give deference to the DOJ's choice to settle the case and
the remedies adopted when making the decision whether to adopt the
decree as an order of the court.
D. Standard of Review of the District Court's Decision on Remedy by
Appellate Courts
A third problem with the treatment of the proposed remedy by the
DOJ and the courts in Microsoft H is that the scope of review of the
district court's determination by higher courts of the remedy necessary
to prevent and restrain the violations found in a case litigated to final
judgment is unlawfully limited. Rather than defer to the discretion of
the trial court under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52218 in adopting a remedy under § 4 of the Sherman
Act, appellate review of the trial court's determination of whether the
perchance the United States moved in at the incipient stages of the unlawful project.
For these reasons divestiture or dissolution is an essential feature of these decrees.
Schine Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 128 (citing United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323
U.S. 173, 189 (1944)).
217. Microsoft I1: Final Judgment, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 154 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing
Microsoft 1: Appeal, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
218. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentarv evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
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consent decree is in the public interest under the Tunney Act would be
analyzed under the standard of whether the district court had given due
deference to the determination of the DOJ that the appropriate remedy
has been entered. The latter is the erroneous standard applied by the
court of appeals in its review of Microsoft I, settled without litigation by
a true Tunney Act consent decree. That court observed:
If the essential dispute between amici and appellants were more
narrowly cast as objections to the remedies sought, the district judge
would still not be empowered to reject them merely because he
believed other remedies were preferable. As we have said in the
context of reviewing agreed upon modifications of a consent decree:
The court should also bear in mind the flexibility of the public
interest inquiry: the court's function is not to determine whether
the resulting array of rights and liabilities "is one that will best
serve society," but only to confirm that the resulting settlement is
"'within the reaches of the public interest.'"
Thus, a court should not reject an agreed-upon modification
unless "it has exceptional confidence that adverse antitrust
consequences will result-perhaps akin to the confidence that would
justify a court in overturning the predictive judgments of an
administrative agency." 219
Clearly, there is a significant difference between the standards for
appellate review of a trial court's findings under Sherman Act § 4 and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52220 and those the court of appeals
erroneously held applied in a Tunney Act proceeding, which gives
deference to the DOJ's choice of remedy akin to the predictive
judgments of an administrative agency. 221  Because the proposed
settlement in Microsoft II was clearly not a consent decree to be
weighed under Tunney Act standards, the court should have established
that the trial on remand did not involve a Tunney Act proceeding or the
erroneous standard of review of the Tunney Act proceeding previously
219. Microsoft 1: Appeal, 56 F.3d at 1460 (per curiam) (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and United States v. W. Elec. Co.,
993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (reversing and remanding Judge Sporkin's refusal to
approve a consent decree proposed without any litigation of the underlying complaint by way of
taking testimony in open court).
220. Under these standards, a court must impose remedies that prevent current and future
conduct and deprive the defendant of the fruits of its unlawful conduct.
221. See United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The [Tunney
Act] suggests that a court may, and perhaps should, look beyond the strict relationship between
complaint and remedy in evaluating the public interest. We cannot agree that a district court
should engage in an unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public."); see also
Microsoft I: Appeal, 56 F.3d at 1458-62 (per curiam) (discussing the scope of the district court's
consideration of public interest under the Tunney Act).
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mandated by the court of appeals. By finding that the proposed
settlement was a consent decree for Tunney Act purposes, the trial court
bound itself to approve the proposed decree under the erroneous
deference standard set forth in Microsoft 1.222 This also raised the
following question: Why hold a hearing on the proposed remedies of the
dissenting states if the only function of the court is to defer to the DOJ's
proposed remedy?
In the event that a party seeks review of the Microsoft II final
judgment on remedies, the claims of the proponents of the alleged
"consent decree" that the Tunney Act standards apply, and whether trial
court deference is due, the court of appeals should adhere to its
statements in Microsoft H.223 Additionally, the court is bound to apply
the law Congress adopted and not engage in judicial activism by
amending that statute. Such a decree must be "vacated whenever there
is 'a bona fide disagreement concerning substantive items of relief
which could be resolved only by trial.' 224 Review must be based upon
the standards established by § 4 of the Sherman Act, the record of the
trial on the merits, and Rules 43, 52, and 54 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure after an open proceeding in the district court where all
the parties of record have a full and equal opportunity to propose a
remedy. The trial court-and only the trial court-can fashion a
remedy to prevent future, and cure current, violations of the Sherman
Act found pursuant to a fully litigated judgment of the trial court.
Given the mandate of the court of appeals and the fact that the proposed
settlement is not a "consent decree" for Tunney Act purposes, the trial
court's holding that the DOJ proposed settlement is a consent decree for
Tunney Act purposes creates a procedural morass. Now that an appeal
is pending, 225 sorting out which standard of review should be applied to
the trial court's decision should be as entertaining, if not as
enlightening, as that followed by the trial court in its review of the
"consent decree" and trial of the dissenting states' remedy proposals.
222. See supra Part IV (discussing Microsoft I).
223. See supra note 25 (quoting Microsoft 11: Appeal, in which the court of appeals explained
that a district court must fully explore the facts of a case to properly draw a decree).
224. Microsoft If: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34, 101 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting United States v. Ward
Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1964)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
225. Massachusetts and West Virginia are appealing Judge Kollar-Kotelly's ruling. See Kim
Peterson, W. Virginia Joins Fight to Appeal Settlement; Microsoft Case, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 3,
2002, at CI, available at 2002 WL 3924242.
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E. The Right to Have Proposed Remedies Given Equal Consideration
A fourth reason the Microsoft H trial court should have addressed the
jurisdictional issue of whether the DOJ was improperly usurping the
powers conferred on the court by § 4 of the Sherman Act and Rules 43,
52, and 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to prevent the
deprivation of the equal right of all the parties to participate in the
court's determination of the appropriate remedy. By virtue of having
drafted and submitted to the court a proposed "consent decree," the
DOJ, Microsoft, and some of the parties preempted other parties of
record from fully participating in the process of determining the
appropriate remedy, compromised the role of the court in formulating
the remedy it may have found necessary to cure the violations upheld on
appeal, and read § 4 out of the Sherman Act. The trial court then
sanctioned the misuse of the Tunney Act by bifurcating the trial on
remedy into two separate proceedings and holding that the proposed
decree was a Tunney Act consent decree, further exacerbating the
problem for dissenting parties to the case.
Parties of record found themselves addressing what they believed to
be good or bad elements of the proposed consent decree put forth by the
DOJ and Microsoft and not advocating their own independent judgment
and positions of what should be the appropriate remedy, independent of
the proposal labeled a "consent decree" pending before the court. The
trial court struggled with the definition of the appropriate standard of
review after the dissenting states' remedy trial and appeared to measure
the dissenting states' remedy proposals against those proposed by the
DOJ's "consent decree." Parties of record should be free to propose
their own structural and/or conduct remedies in a single proceeding,
should they believe that such remedies are necessary to prevent future
and current violations of the Sherman Act, and not be forced to pick
apart the DOJ's proposal under the standards forced upon them by
Microsoft I.
Similarly, the DOJ and Microsoft caused the court to fall into the
position of running two separate remedy proceedings on substantially
different standards where only one was legally permissible and justified
by the processes mandated by § 4 of the Sherman Act, the doctrine of
the separation of powers, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
mandate of the court of appeals. The two-track approach also had the
potential to cause confusion if the dissenting states had been free to
propose different remedies under § 4 of the Sherman Act. For example,
suppose that Judge Kollar-Kotelly had found that the appropriate
remedy in the litigating states' case should be divestiture of the
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operating system functions 226  of Microsoft from the application
software. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, however, must also approve the
consent decree unless the court has exceptional confidence that adverse
antitrust consequences will result, according to the D.C. Circuit's
erroneous interpretation of the Tunney Act in Microsoft I and her
erroneous finding that the Tunney Act applies to review of the proposed
settlement in Microsoft 11.227
If the trial court ordered divestiture to prevent and restrain future as
well as past violations, the consent decree would be nonsensical.
Therefore, several questions would have arisen. First, is the court free
to order divestiture when doing so would destroy the meaning and the
function of the consent decree under the standards of review mandated
by Microsoft I, or is the court precluded from issuing remedies that
would limit the consent decree? If the latter, does the consent decree
preempt remedies that might be had under the pendant state antitrust
law claims before the judge? 228 This confusion could be avoided with
the recognition that the final judgment proposed by the DOJ is not a
Tunney Act consent decree. Thus, the court should have found that it
was always free to accept or to reject the proposed final judgment or
grant whatever relief it deems necessary under its equitable powers
conferred by § 4 of the Sherman Act. In order to impose such a remedy,
a trial would have been necessary, pursuant to the appellate court's
mandate, such that all parties to the case could present their own
226. It is a common misperception that the court of appeals effectively eliminated the option
of the judge on remand to order divestiture. On the contrary, the court stated:
As a general matter, a district court is afforded broad discretion to enter that relief
it calculates will best remedy the conduct it has found to be unlawful.... This is no
less true in antitrust cases .... And divestiture is a common form of relief in successful
antitrust prosecutions: it is indeed "the most important of antitrust remedies."
On remand, the District Court must reconsider whether the use of a structural
remedy of divestiture is appropriate with respect to Microsoft ....
Microsoft II: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 105.
227. See supra Parts IV, VI (discussing the erroneous interpretation and application of the
Tunney Act in Microsoft I & II).
228. The final judgment by Judge Jackson, affirmed by the court of appeals, found violations
of the state antitrust laws of each of the party states. The states are presumably entitled to enforce
their own state laws and decrees entered pursuant to those laws without the consent of the federal
government. See Microsoft II: Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
The Court [in Microsoft I: Conclusions of Law wa]s persuaded that the evidence in the
record proving violations of the Sherman Act also satisfies the elements of analogous
causes of action arising under the laws of each plaintiff state. For this reason, and for
others stated below, the Court [held] Microsoft liable under those particular state laws
as well.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (2000) (suspending statute of limitations for "every private or State
right of action" during the pendency of a government action based upon the same fact).
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proposals, independent of that pending before the court at the insistence
of the DOJ, in a single proceeding. It was up to the court-not the DOJ
and Microsoft meeting in secret-to determine the appropriate remedies
where there was a final court ruling that the defendant had violated the
antitrust laws. Should similar cases arise in the future, a single remedy
proceeding should be held with the court exercising the powers
conferred by § 4 of the Sherman Act to make its own independent
determination of the remedies necessary to prevent and restrain
violations of the antitrust laws. To hold otherwise would not only
undermine the appropriate standard of judicial review of proposed
remedies for antitrust violations, but also undermine the congressional
purpose of retaining the threat of the prima facie effect of § 5(a) to
encourage antitrust defendants to enter into consent decrees without
litigating a case and tying up scarce enforcement resources.
F. Denial of Prima Facie Effect
A fifth problem with characterizing the final judgment proposed by
the DOJ as a Tunney Act proceeding is that doing so may deprive
subsequent treble damage action plaintiffs of the use of the "final
judgment or decree" as prima facie evidence of a violation. Plaintiffs
may also be deprived of the use of evidence developed during the
remedy proceedings, including evidence similar to the competitive
impact statement required under § 5(e) of the Tunney Act, testimony
similar to that required by § 5(f) of the Tunney Act, and any other
evidence that might be derived from the district court's proceeding on
remedy. These consequences are specifically provided for by § 5(h) of
the Tunney Act, but only in exchange for "consent judgments or decrees
entered before any testimony has been taken." 229
Congress made clear in the legislative history of the Tunney Act that
it was designed to preserve the prima facie effect of judgments and
decrees "entered as a result of litigation." 230  Part VIII of the final
229. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
230. H.R. REP. No. 93-1463 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6537.
Because of the protracted nature of antitrust litigation, with the expense and
complexity of proof of the legal and economic issues involved, it is difficult at best for
a private citizen to prosecute to conclusion an action under the antitrust laws. When the
private litigant is deprived of the use of the Government's decree as prima facie
evidence, moreover, a private action becomes virtually impossible to maintain.
ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON THE CONSENT
DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 24 (Comm. Print 1959); see also N.J. Wood
Finishing Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 354 (3d Cir. 1964) (explaining that the
purposes of § 5(a) and § 5(i) of the Clayton Act were "to stimulate private antitrust suits and
aid ... private suitors"). Private suitors were aided by "making available to them all matters
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judgment approved by the district court in the Microsoft case expressly
provides: "[n]othing in this Final Judgment is intended to confer upon
any other persons any rights or remedies of any nature whatsoever
hereunder or by reason of this Final Judgment. "231
The court, the DOJ, Microsoft, and other parties to the final judgment
apparently believed that they could not only assume the power
conferred on courts to fashion a final decree under § 4 of the Sherman
Act but also could assume the powers of Congress to repeal § 5(a) of
the Clayton Act! 232 That section of the final decree was a blatant
violation of § 5(a) of the Clayton Act and the powers of Congress to
repeal legislation.
The intent of the DOJ and Microsoft was to assert that the final
judgment, decree, and any evidence taken in open court during the
remedy phase of the case would not be subject to the prima facie effect
of litigated judgments or decrees. To hold or imply that the proposed
Microsoft H decree was a consent decree subject to a Tunney Act
process is an obvious violation of the prima facie effect of litigated
antitrust judgments in subsequent damage actions that Congress
mandated in § 5(a) of the Clayton Act. To sanction such language in a
previously established by the Government in antitrust actions" and "vouchsaf[ing] the intended
benefits of related government proceedings by suspending the running of the statute of
limitations." Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. N.J. Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 317-18
(1965) (quoting Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951), and Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569 (10th Cir. 1962)).
As the House Report explained:
Present law [now § 5(a)] ... encourages settlement by consent decrees as part of the
legal policies expressed in the antitrust laws. Consent decrees, unlike decrees entered
as a result of litigation, are not available as prima facie evidence against defendants in
public antitrust cases in subsequent private antitrust cases. The bill [proposed §§ 5(b)-
(h)] preserves these legal and enforcement policies and, moreover, expressly makes
judicial proceedings brought under the bill as well as the impact statement required to
be filed prior thereto inadmissible against defendants of the public antitrust action in
subsequent antitrust actions, if any.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1463 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6537; see also 51 CONG.
REC. 1962, 1964 (1914) (President Wilson's Special Message to Congress).
231. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 277 (D.D.C. 2002) (emphasis added).
232. The D.C. Circuit rejected a similar attempt in 1984:
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, by its terms, applies to consent judgments entered after
testimony has been taken.... With increasing frequency, parties to antitrust
agreements are inserting into consent agreements nonliability clauses such as that
contained in the [Modification of Final Judgment]. We do not believe that the mere
appendage of such a clause should automatically make section 5(a) inapplicable; such a
per se rule would contravene the congressional mandate contained in the statute. The
question in each case must be whether the judgment, considered as a whole, is "to the
effect that" the defendant has violated the antitrust laws.
S. Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Michigan v.
Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 62 (D. Minn. 1966)).
20031
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
final court judgment after litigation has taken place is an open invitation
to antitrust defendants to fully litigate a government antitrust case and,
if they lose, enter a consent decree purporting to remedy the violation
found while asserting that there has been no finding of illegality.233
Thus, they can later claim that the "consent decree" immunizes that
which it was never intended to immunize-the consequences of a fully
litigated final judgment and decree and evidence produced during the
remedy phase of the trial for subsequent damage actions under § 5(a) of
the Clayton Act.234 Moreover, it would be contrary to the admonition
of the court of appeals in the Microsoft case that the threat of treble
damage actions be maintained to secure compliance with the decree and
the antitrust laws:
We do not mean to say that enforcement actions will no longer play an
important role in curbing infringements of the antitrust laws in
technologically dynamic markets, nor do we assume this in assessing
the merits of this case. Even in those cases where forward-looking
remedies appear limited, the Government will continue to have an
interest in defining the contours of the antitrust laws so that law-
abiding firms will have a clear sense of what is permissible and what
is not. And the threat of private damage actions will remain to deter
those firms inclined to test the limits of the law. 23 5
The only way to resolve this obvious circumvention of the intent of
Congress and the court of appeals is to read the Tunney Act for what it
clearly states: that a Tunney Act proceeding can only be invoked for a
true consent decree entered before any litigation has taken place, not
settlements after testimony has been taken, let alone proposed
settlements of fully litigated cases. Attempts to circumvent the statute
by steps like the language in the final judgment entered by the court,
purporting to be made pursuant to the Tunney Act, does not confer
immunity236 from the prima facie effect of § 5(a) because the proposed
233. In Microsoft 11, there is no question that there have been clear final findings of violations
of § 2 of the Sherman Act after a fully litigated case.
234. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a). The language now found in the final judgment in the Microsoft
case means the court has joined the proponents of the judgment in unconstitutionally asserting the
power to repeal § 5(a) of the Clayton Act. See Microsoft I1: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
235. Microsoft 11: Appeal, 253 F.3d at 49.
236. As noted by the D.C. Circuit, judicial precedent "is not the parties' property" that can be
used as a "bargaining chip in the process of settlement." In re United States, 927 F.2d 626, 628
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Mem'l Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir.
1988)); see also Humphreys v. DEA, 105 F.3d 112, 115 n.I (3d Cir 1996) ("[A]ppellate courts
routinely refuse to vacate their own decisions when the parties settle their dispute after an
appellate decision has issued."); Okla. Radio Assoc. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe
worthy goal of encouraging settlements does not 'override[] the policy that a losing party with a
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remedy is not a consent decree within the meaning of § 5(a). Even
though courts may require the parties to proceed by filing the remedies
they think best and statements similar to a competitive impact statement
in support of their proposals, jurisdiction to do so cannot be premised on
the Tunney Act without violating § 5(a) of the Clayton Act. The only
basis for further proceedings by the district court was that provided by
§ 4 of the Sherman Act, the standards of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the mandate of the court of appeals. The trial court's
ruling, finding that the proposed remedy in Microsoft II is a consent
decree for Tunney Act purposes, and adoption of language attempting to
limit third party use of the judgment not only ignores the court's
jurisdiction under § 4 of the Sherman Act but also repudiates the
express language of § 5(a) of the Clayton Act and the clear implication
of § 5(h) of the Act.237
VII. PROPER APPLICATION OF THE TUNNEY ACT
OR § 4 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Given the legislative history described above and the prior discussion
of the consequences of the abuse in Microsoft I and misuse of the
Tunney Act in situations where it is not warranted in Microsoft H, it is
possible to construct a framework under which to analyze whether the
Tunney Act is the appropriate tool for reviewing a proposed remedy or
whether the situation calls for application of § 4 of the Sherman Act and
the courts' equitable powers. What follows is a framework for the
application of the Tunney Act, § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, and § 4 of the
Sherman Act.
A. "Testimony Has Been Taken"
Recall that prima facie effect is given to final judgments or decrees
except those "consent judgments or decrees entered before any
testimony has been taken." 238  Thus, the key issue in determining
deep pocket should not be permitted to use a settlement to have an adverse precedent vacated."');
In re Mem'l Hosp. of Iowa County, 862 F.2d at 1302 ("When the parties' bargain calls for judicial
action... the benefits of settlements to the parties are not the only desiderata.").
237. The implication arises because § 5(h) makes inadmissible proceedings in a consent
decree proceeding that comply with § 5(e) of the Tunney Act. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(h). As
previously stated, § 5(e) defines the public interest standard in terms of a proposed decree where
there has not been a trial of the issues. Id. § 16(e).
238. Id. § 16(a).
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whether the Tunney Act applies is whether "testimony has been taken,"
within the meaning of § 5(a) of the Clayton Act.239
The legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests that § 5(a) was
passed in order to give plaintiffs an additional weapon in their arsenal
against defendant trusts. The original language of § 5(a) of the Clayton
Act provided that final judgments entered into in prior government
antitrust actions were "conclusive evidence against the defendant of the
law and facts determined in the prior equity action." 240 The House
conferred upon the plaintiff one-way estoppel: a judgment finding that a
violation of the Sherman Act would preclude a defendant from
relitigating liability. The plaintiff, however, would not be precluded
from bringing a private antitrust action due to a finding that the
defendant was not liable. 241 The Senate Judiciary Committee had
concerns that the one-way conclusive effect the House had given the
final judgment would be unconstitutional under a due process
analysis. 242  Because of these due process concerns, the Senate
Judiciary Committee changed the effect that a final judgment would
have on a defendant in subsequent litigation from a conclusive evidence
standard to one where the final judgment would only have prima facie
239. Id. The significance of taking testimony for drawing the line between a Tunney Act
proceeding and a proceeding under § 4 of the Sherman Act in the remedy phase of a government
antitrust case is further highlighted by the language of § 5(e)(2) of the Tunney Act instructing the
Court to measure the public benefit of a proposed consent decree in light of the "benefit, if any, to
be derived from a determination of the issues at trial." Id. § 16(e)(2).
240. H.R. REP. No. 627, pt. 1, at 13 (1914), reprinted in 2 EARL W. KINTER, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 1089
(1978); see also John A. Doninger § Robert F. Frandeen, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and the
Use of Collateral Estoppel by a Private Plaintiff in a Treble Damage Action, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 74,
83 (1973); Daniel R. Fischel, The Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litigation:
Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 342
(1976).
241. This principle ran contrary to the generally accepted principle of the time that estoppel
must be mutual. The mutuality requirement held that unless both parties are bound by a prior
judgment, neither is so bound. See Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder
of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (1968) ("[T]he rule of mutuality in collateral estoppel
holds that unless both parties are bound by a prior judgment, neither may use the prior judgment
as determinative of an issue in a second action."). See generally James G. Hazard et. al., Note,
Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 1002 (1979) (discussing the offensive use of collateral estoppel in the context of
Parklane Hoisery v. Shore); Michael Kimmel, Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967) (discussing
the distinction between offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel by a nonparty). Courts
did not begin to reject the mutuality requirement until 1942. See Bernhard v. Bank of America,
122 P.2d 892, 894 (Cal. 1942) ("There is no compelling reason.., for requiring that the party
asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier
litigation.").
242. S. REP. No. 698, at45 (1914).
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effect.24 3  The struggle that Congress faced with the mutuality
requirement demonstrates a strong desire to give plaintiffs the full
benefit of any final judgment in a government antitrust action. 244
Congress sought to eliminate the barriers that private plaintiffs
faced 245 in bringing an antitrust suit.246 Congress believed that private
litigation was expensive and time consuming, given that the private
plaintiff was required to re-litigate the very claims won by the
government in prior litigation. 247 As President Wilson stated:
"It is not fair that the private litigant should be obliged to set up and
establish again the facts which the Government has proved. He can not
afford, he has not the power, to make use of such processes of inquiry
as the Government has command of. Thus shall individual justice be
done while the processes of business are rectified and squared with
general conscience." 248
Thus, Congress established § 5(a) to better enable private plaintiffs to
bring antitrust suits in order to remedy harms done to them by easing
proof of a violation of law. 249 Even though Congress, at the time of the
243. Id.
244. "[W]e have given to the citizen, in addition to the remedy he now has, an additional
remedy, so far as the future is concerned, and we have not taken away by the statute any right
which he now has." 51 CONG. REC. 16,058 (1914) (statement of Sen. Overman).
245. Of the forty-six private suits filed between the passage of the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, only four were successful. See E.E.W., Jr., Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole:
Collateral Effect for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements, 55 VA. L. REV. 1334, 1336-37 n.8
(1969).
246. See 51 CONG. REC. 9270 (1914) (statement of Rep. Carlin) (noting at length that the
Clayton Act gives private plaintiffs the right to sue, allows private plaintiffs to use final
judgments in government actions as evidence against defendants, and suspends the statute of
limitations while a government suit is pending in order to facilitate the bringing of actions by
private plaintiffs).
247. See id at 16,058 (statement of Sen. Clapp). Senator Moses Clapp reiterated the views of
President Wilson:
[The litigation of a private antitrust suit] requires a long and sustained effort to bring
one of these great combinations to the bar of justice; it requires the expenditure of a
vast amount of money; and it seemed to us ... that one of the things that was unjust
and unfair was that a man injured and wronged by a trust should have to travel over the
same road again in his suit for damages that the Government had traversed in bringing
the trust to the bar of justice.
Id.
248. Id. (statement of Sen. Clapp) (quoting President Wilson).
249. See id. at 9090 (statement of Rep. Mitchell). Representative John Mitchell described at
length the importance of § 5(a):
A remarkable situation prevailed when the Government won its suits against the
Standard Oil Co. and the Tobacco Trust. In these cases the Supreme Court of the
United States found unanimously, without a dissenting voice, that acts had been
committed which were not only illegal but immoral. These combinations had been
effected, in large part, by the crushing out of rivals. At the end of these very long court
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passage of the Clayton Act, did not believe that private plaintiffs would
have an additional deterrent effect on potential violators, many now
recognize that private plaintiffs serve an important deterrence
function. 250  Moreover, in seeking to maintain the prima facie effect of
§ 5(a) of the Clayton Act, Congress acknowledged the private plaintiff's
deterrence role when passing the Tunney Act.25 1 Scarce enforcement
resources were also conserved by giving defendants a significant
incentive to settle government cases without litigation. 252  In light of
this general policy of encouraging suits by private plaintiffs through use
of a final judgment or decree obtained in a government case as prima
facie evidence against a defendant and maintaining the incentive to
settle government cases to conserve scarce enforcement resources, the
question arises as to under what circumstances this weapon was
supposed to be implemented.
There is some discussion in the legislative history indicating that
prima facie effect should be given to cases that have begun and in which
a decree or final judgment has been rendered. The original language of
Clayton Act § 5(a) had two provisions relating to the prima facie effect:
(1) "This section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees
proceedings a decree was finally entered, declaring that there should be a segregation.
The lamentable fact, then, became patent that those who had been crushed and driven
out of business, "the heroes," as one witness put it, "who had made it possible for the
Government successfully to conduct its proceedings to a final decree," were left
without a remedy, and no way could be found that would give them redress for the
wrongs which they had suffered.
The situation was, indeed, intolerable and a travesty upon justice. Small wonder
that men cried out in their hopelessness that there was no justice in the land for the
poor. It was found that none of those who were injured could, under existing law,
recover for the injuries that had been sustained by the illegal acts of these
combinations. They could, of course, institute entirely new proceedings, but they could
not in any way benefit from the decree which had been entered.
Id.
250. This result is likely due to the threat of treble damages. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-16 (2000);
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., REPORT ON STUDY OF THE
ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY I (Comm. Print 1984) (statement of Rep. Garvey) (noting
that private actions are the principal vehicle for enforcing the antitrust laws). Representative
George E. Garvey's view may have been relevant especially during the Reagan era of antitrust
non-enforcement. See also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (quoting
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)), which states: "Section 4 of the Clayton
Act... 'contains little in the way of restrictive language.' And the lack of restrictive language
reflects Congress' 'expansive remedial purpose' in enacting § 4: Congress sought to create a
private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their
illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations."
251. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the invocation of consent decrees
and nolo contendere pleas through the threat of treble damage actions).
252. See supra note 81 (discussing the Antitrust Division's description of consent decrees).
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entered before any testimony has been taken"; 253 and (2) "This section
shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees rendered in criminal
proceedings or suits in equity now pending in which the taking of
testimony has been commenced but has not been concluded ....
Congress designed the latter section to give current litigants an
opportunity to settle via consent decree and, thus, protect themselves
from the prima facie effect provision. 255 If, instead of settling, the
defendant continued with litigation-"the taking of testimony"-any
judgment or decree in that case could be used against the defendant by
subsequent private party plaintiffs.256 Thus, the exemption presumed
that any decree entered into after the taking of testimony in court would
be subject to the prima facie effect under § 5(a). Moreover, because
Congress sought to preserve the prima facie effect when passing the
Tunney Act, it is clear that consent decrees cannot be entered into once
testimony begins, or in other words, once trial commences.
Because the commencement of trial is the focal point at which the
Tunney Act no longer applies, it is impossible for the Microsoft I
proposed final judgment to be a "consent decree" as that concept is used
in the Tunney Act. Moreover, given the legislative history of the
Tunney Act and the Clayton Act, any judgment or decree entered after
testimony had been taken could not be a consent decree within the
meaning of the Tunney Act. In addition, the final decree and testimony
evidence in the decree proceedings should be admissible in subsequent
treble damage actions along with the final judgment finding violations
of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
253. See 51 CONG. REC. 15,938 (1914).
254. Id. at 15,939.
255. Id.
256. Id. The exchange between Senator Nelson and Senator Norris highlights this result:
SENATOR NORRIS: Does [the second provision] mean that in the cases that are now
pending the trusts may come in and plead guilty before they take all their testimony-
that after this law is passed it will apply to them?
SENATOR NELSON: Yes, certainly; and that you can not use the judgment itself in a suit
brought by anyone else.
SENATOR NORRIS: Exactly; but after the passage of this bill-assuming that it becomes
law-if some additional evidence is taken this exemption would not apply, as I
understand it. Is that what it means?
SENATOR NELSON: If they do not plead guilty without taking further evidence, they do
not get the benefit.
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B. Application of the Tunney Act or § 4 of the Sherman Act
The preceding discussion raises the obvious question: When does the
Tunney Act apply? The answer is that the Tunney Act applies to any
settlement entered into between the government and a defendant in an
antitrust proceeding before trial commences. Once trial commences, the
case could either be litigated fully or be settled during trial. In either
case, it is not the Tunney Act that applies. Instead, the full equitable
powers of the court and § 4 of the Sherman Act, or § 15 of the Clayton
Act if the violation is found under the Clayton Act, will apply.
DOJ Investigation
DOJ Decision to File a Complaint*
No Settlement
Settlement (Consent Decree)1
Complaint
Settlement Before Trial Commences Settlement After Trial
Commences or Case Is
Fully Litigated
Complaint with Competitive Consent Decree Court Applies Its Equitable
Impact Statement I Powers Under § 4 of the
ISherman Act or § 15 of the
Clayton Act
Tunney Act Tunney Act
Court Applies "Public Court Applies "Public
Interest" Standard Interest" Standard
FIGURE 1: PROPER APPLICATION OF THE TUNNEY ACT AND § 4 OF
THE SHERMAN ACT
*Once the DOJ has filed a complaint, with or without a competitive impact statement,
prosecutorial discretion ends and the matter is now in the realm of the courts and the
judicial function
Figure 1 outlines the methodology implicit in the legislative history
that distinguishes between Tunney Act proceedings and other
settlements. If the DOJ and the defendant agree to settle prior to the
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filing of a complaint,2 57 then the Tunney Act clearly applies. The DOJ
would file a complaint, a consent decree, and a competitive impact
statement. The consent decree would be subject to Tunney Act
review-namely, public comments would be solicited and the judge
would make an independent determination with no deference to the
DOJ-as to whether the settlement is in the public interest.
This methodology differs from what traditionally took place prior to
the enactment of the Tunney Act, with respect to consent decrees, in
one significant respect. As was discussed above,258 the court owes no
deference to the DOJ's proposed remedy and is required under the
Tunney Act to make its own independent determination as to whether
the remedy is in the public interest. If the court fails to make an
independent determination without deference to the DOJ, as was the
case in Microsoft I giving rise to the first "Microsoft Fallacy" it would
be ignoring the express language of § 5(e) and the legislative history of
the Tunney Act discussed above. Courts would return to the days of
judicial rubber-stamping of consent decrees-the very thing that
Congress sought to eliminate when it passed the Tunney Act.259 It may
also be the case that the DOJ and defendants settle at some point after
the complaint is filed and prior to the commencement of trial. In these
circumstances, the Tunney Act also applies, as does the court's
independent judgment of whether to approve the consent decree,
without deference to the DOJ.
The polar opposite scenario would be a case that has been litigated
fully to a final judgment. In such a case, § 4 of the Sherman Act clearly
applies and the Tunney Act does not. Once a final judgment has been
entered, the judge has the responsibility and the discretion to consider
all possible remedies in order to implement the most effective remedy:
The Supreme Court has explained that a remedies decree in an
antitrust case must seek to "unfetter a market from anti-competitive
conduct,"... "terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the defendant
257. Note that the methodology outlined in Figure 1 recognizes that the decision whether or
not to file a complaint is a decision within the DOJ's prosecutorial discretion. In keeping with the
understanding of the separation of powers explicit in the Tunney Act's legislative history,
however, the entry of any decree is an inherently judicial act. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the
executive branch's infringement on congressionally conferred judicial power).
258. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the infringement on congressionally conferred judicial
power by the executive branch).
259. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Tunney's argument in
favor of an act that insured independent judicial judgment in antitrust consent decrees).
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the fruits of the statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no
practices likely to result in monopolization in the future." 260
Thus, once a finding has been made as to liability, the court has an
obligation to insure that the remedy imposed eliminates the actual and
potential evils brought forth by the monopolist. The court in such a
case would be free to ignore the proposed settlement by the parties if the
court believed that it failed to cure the ills of anticompetitive conduct.
The court also could hold hearings in order to ascertain what remedy
would cure these same ills and must do so where there are other parties
to the case contesting the remedy. The court also would have discretion
to have Tunney-like hearings and solicit public comment-as Judge
Greene did in the AT&T case261-in order to acquire information
sufficient to make a determination as to remedy once a finding of
liability has been entered.
Microsoft H took place in the context outlined above. A final
judgment had been entered as to liability. What was left was a hearing
or trial on remedy-a trial mandated by the court of appeals. The DOJ
cannot usurp the powers of the court and the court's obligation to
determine independently an appropriate remedy by mislabeling a
proposed final judgment a "consent decree" at a stage of a proceeding
well beyond the "taking of testimony." Nor can the court ignore the
purpose of Congress in adopting the Tunney Act by applying it and the
first "Microsoft Fallacy" in circumstances where Congress did not
intend for the Act to be applied. To do so would be to compound the
first "Microsoft Fallacy" by adopting the second "Microsoft Fallacy,"
undermining not only the structure and incentives of § 5(a) of the
Clayton Act, but also the incentives for entering a consent decree before
any litigation has taken place.
260. Microsoft 11: Appeal, 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562, 577 (1972), and United States v. United Shoe Mach., 391 U.S. 244, 250
(1968)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
366 U.S. 316, 366 n. 12 (1961) ("'In general the object of the remedies under the anti-trust laws is
to prevent the continuance of wrongful conduct, and to deprive the wrongdoers of the fruits of
their unlawful conduct, and to prevent the creation anew of restraint forbidden by law."' (quoting
United States v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 356, 357 (D.C. Mass. 1957))); see also
Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253 (1959) ("The decree should (1) put
,an end to the combination or conspiracy when that is itself the violation'; (2) deprive 'the
antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy'; and (3) 'break up or render impotent the
monopoly power which violates the Act."' (quoting Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334
U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948))).
261. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). The court would be able to do this under its
broad equitable powers. Regardless, the holding of such hearings would not make the decree
entered into a "consent decree" under the Tunney Act.
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The final possibility is where a settlement or dismissal of the
complaint is proposed after trial has commenced but before entry of any
final judgment. In that situation, some testimony has been taken, but
there has not been a complete trial on the merits before the judge.
Instead, the parties offer a proposed final judgment or the DOJ moves to
dismiss the complaint.262 The judge may or may not accept the
proposed judgment under the court's equitable powers. The judge has
the discretion to hold additional hearings in order to determine whether
the settlement "prevent[s] and restrain[s] violations," 263 and fulfill the
court's obligations under § 4 of the Sherman Act or § 15 of the Clayton
Act. In order to make that determination, the judge may hold hearings,
solicit public comment, and order the filing of a Tunney-like
"competitive impact statement," explaining the proposed decree.264 No
deference would be due to the DOJ's proposed remedy because the
court would be exercising its independent power under § 4 of the
Sherman Act or § 15 of the Clayton Act.
Additionally, the DOJ would not be entitled, under this scenario, to
repeal § 5(a) of the Clayton Act by inserting exculpatory language into
the settlement.265 Section 5(a) clearly indicates that once testimony has
been taken and a settlement is proposed, the exculpatory language
cannot be inserted because when any evidence is taken, hearings on the
remedy and the decree may be used as prima facie evidence against the
defendant. Thus, the court would be obligated to strike any such
exculpatory language should it choose to accept a proposed settlement
under the guidelines set forth above.
In the event the DOJ moves to dismiss the case, the motion should
generally be considered a decision within the discretion of the DOJ, in
262. Because some testimony has been taken, the proposed Final judgment would not be a
consent decree.
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act have parallel
provisions. See id. §§ 4, 25.
264. This is precisely what Judge Greene did in the AT&T case without making the
determination of whether or not the decree before him was a consent decree within the meaning
of the Tunney Act. If the proceeding were a Tunney Act proceeding, § 5(f) would have allowed
him to conduct hearings and take testimony to determine whether or not the decree was in the
public interest. See supra note 212 (quoting § 5(f) of the Tunney Act, which provides the steps a
court may take in examining a proposed consent decree). Alternatively, if the proceeding was not
conducted under the Tunney Act, Judge Greene could use his equitable powers under § 4 of the
Sherman Act to hold hearings and take testimony to determine whether the proposed decree
would prevent and restrain violations of the Sherman Act. See supra note 24 (discussing the
specific jurisdictional component of § 4 of the Sherman Act); see also Part III.C (discussing
Judge Greene's decision in the AT&T case).
265. See supra note 231 and accompanying text for an example of such language.
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the absence of some reason to the contrary. 266 Such a motion would
obviously not be one subject to either the Tunney Act or § 4 of the
Sherman Act because neither a consent decree is being proposed in such
circumstances nor is there any request for injunctive relief being sought
from the court requiring invocation of the its equitable powers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The abuse and misuse of the Tunney Act in Microsoft I and
Microsoft II, which created two new antitrust "fallacies," has eliminated
independent judicial review of consent decrees, abrogated the power
and obligation of the courts to remedy harms caused by violations of the
antitrust laws, undermined the incentives to enter into consent decrees,
and raised serious constitutional and procedural issues that may lead
any court applying the Tunney Act into error. Both decisions reflect a
startling disregard for the intent of Congress, the purposes of the
Tunney Act, the rights of potential damage claimants, and the sensible
management of antitrust litigation. Abuse of the Tunney Act, by the
adoption of the first "Microsoft Fallacy," has led courts to return to the
days before the Tunney Act when courts rubber-stamped any consent
decree filed by the government.
No reasonable interpretation of the Tunney Act or its legislative
history should lead to the conclusion that where the court is faced with a
consent decree, its sole function is to rubber-stamp that decree. To the
contrary, the legislative history makes clear that Congress wanted the
courts to have an active role-to make an independent determination
as to whether the consent decree is in the public interest. To hold
otherwise-as the D.C. Circuit has done-is to gut the Tunney Act's
standard of judicial review of proposed consent decrees and to engage
in judicial activism that interprets laws not based upon the intent of
Congress and the language of the Act but rather in spite of the express
language and legislative intent of the statute.
Misuse of the Tunney Act by the adoption of the second "Microsoft
Fallacy" led the DOJ to inject executive imperialism into the judicial
function, a step improperly sanctioned by the trial court in Microsoft II.
The Tunney Act makes clear that it applies only to "consent decrees"
and that consent decrees are proposed final judgments entered before
trial commences. By labeling as a consent decree any proposed final
266. The view of this Article is that the decision to dismiss is within the prosecutorial
discretion of the DOJ and neither tramples upon the court's jurisdiction over the matter nor
requires judicial action. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the infringement on congressionally
conferred judicial power by the executive branch).
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judgment arrived at after litigation has taken place, the DOJ can utilize
the prior abuse of the Tunney Act to further its later misuse of the Act.
In other words, the DOJ can usurp the statutory authority of the court
under § 4 of the Sherman Act to determine the appropriate remedy and
confer that power unto itself by labeling a proposed final judgment a
"consent decree."
For the court to sanction such a misuse of the Tunney Act not only is
contrary to the legislative history of the Act, but also eliminates § 4 of
the Sherman Act as the source of the court's power to remedy violations
of the Sherman Act, creates confusion over the appropriate standard to
apply to review of the trial court's decision with respect to the proposed
decree, denies other parties to the litigation of the remedy phase of an
antitrust case a fair hearing on their proposed remedies, deprives private
parties of rights guaranteed them by § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, and has
resulted in a final decree in Microsoft H which should be reversed on
jurisdictional grounds. The result is a limitation on the power of the
court to craft an appropriate remedy and establishes a harsher standard
of review for any remedy so crafted. The incentives for entering a
consent decree before any testimony is taken are also reduced because
an antitrust defendant may have nothing to lose by litigating a case to
final judgment finding illegality and then agreeing to a settlement that
can later be argued is a consent decree. Moreover, sanctioning such a
perversion of the statutory scheme in Microsoft H ignores the law of the
case and the mandate of the court of appeals that a hearing was to be
held regarding to remedy. Additionally, other parties are denied the
right to have their proposed remedies heard on equal footing with the
DOJ proposal.
The misuse of the Tunney Act has significant impacts on the rights of
third parties as well. By mislabeling the final judgment a "consent
decree," the DOJ and a court may, with one quick flash of the pen, seek
to eliminate all the rights conferred upon third parties by § 5(a) of the
Clayton Act. The purported "consent decree"-the final judgment in
the case-would lack prima facie effect, enabling the DOJ to effectively
repeal § 5(a) of the Clayton Act and the incentive of defendants to enter
into consent decrees.
The enormous problems outlined above arise from a total
misinterpretation of the Tunney Act and its legislative history. A more
reasonable interpretation, one consistent with the legislative history of
the Tunney Act, avoids these pitfalls. Namely, the Tunney Act applies
if a proposed settlement is reached before trial. Because the Tunney
Act is designed to give the court information with respect to whether the
settlement is in the public interest, this interpretation makes sense. In
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such a proceeding, the judge would make an independent, non-
deferential determination as to whether the consent decree is in the
public interest, assessing whether the proposal prevents and restrains the
violation alleged in light of the factors set forth in § 5(e) of the Tunney
Act. If need be, the court can invoke the powers conferred by § 5(f) to
aid in making its independent "public interest" determination. This
interpretation is not only in agreement with the Act's legislative history,
but also avoids the procedural and constitutional pitfalls outlined above.
Once the DOJ files a complaint and proposed decree, the matter is
before the court and judicial action is necessary.
Once trial commences, the equitable powers of a court are invoked,
and there is no need for the sunlight of the Tunney Act because the
judicial spotlight is already shining on the matter. If a court were to
find its own spotlight to be insufficient, it has the power to hold
hearings to shed even more light on the matter. At this point, the decree
that may be ultimately entered is never a Tunney Act consent decree,
unless Congress rewrites the statute, but rather a decree entered by the
court pursuant to § 4 of the Sherman Act. This interpretation is not only
in agreement with the legislative history of the Tunney Act but also
prevents the DOJ from crafting language in the decree designed to
repeal § 5(a) of the Clayton Act and engaging in inappropriate conduct
in negotiating a settlement of the case.
Absent the proper application of the Tunney Act, and with the use of
consent decrees where they cannot exist (after trial commences),
antitrust enforcement will likely return to the days of secret deals, undue
political interference with antitrust enforcement, limited or nonexistent
private enforcement, and judicial rubber-stamping of proposed consent
decrees. The future use of consent decrees to settle government cases
might itself be undermined because defendants will no longer have an
incentive to settle a case if they are free to litigate the case and then
settle by a consent decree if they lose. That which Congress mandated
will have been taken away through the DOJ and the courts rewriting the
law Congress adopted.
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